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“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”∗∗
I. UNCONSCIOUS CLASSISM AND ELEVATING THE ENTITY RIGHTS OF
SOLE PROPRIETORS
A. Sole Proprietor’s View of the Firm
Significant intellectual capital has rightfully been spent on big
1
business issues. Academic focus on big business issues, as evidenced
∗∗

1

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (analyzing a black
man’s constitutional right to equal accommodation on a public railroad). See generally
CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987)
(offering a comprehensive perspective on the legal and social context of Plessy and its
outcome); LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN
(1999) (providing a thorough study of Justice Harlan and his judicial views); David S.
Bogen, Why the Supreme Court Lied in Plessy, 52 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2007) (criticizing the
Court’s true motives in Plessy).
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002) (discussing how executives influence
their compensation by shaping their own pay arrangements); Bernard Black et al., Outside
Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (discussing the role and liability of independent directors of public companies); Douglas M. Branson, Enron—When All Systems
Fail: Creative Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989
(2003) (assessing the failed protections in corporate and securities law); Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (2006) (exploring the nuances of controlling shareholder structures and the implications of such systems); Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the
Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2006) (providing a nontraditional view of the shielding
analysis, unveiling the roots of management and controlling-shareholder opportunistic
behavior towards creditors and non-controlling, minority owners, or what the authors call
“entity-shielding”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005) (analyzing the challenges
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in business law casebooks, inadvertently ignores sole proprietorship
2
law. Sole proprietorship law is also curiously absent from legal re3
statement and codification efforts, and from state statutory develoment, reflecting the fact that a sole proprietorship can be created
4
without any formality. Despite their absence in many corners, sole
proprietors and the legal complexities they face have recently gained

that securities regulation faces in international market development); Larry E. Ribstein,
International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD.
299 (2003) (analyzing how Sarbanes-Oxley makes U.S. corporation law less appealing to
multinational corporations); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley
model of corporate governance).
2

See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 1–29 (2d ed. 2003) (omitting references to sole proprietorships in discussion of forms of business associations);
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES
AND MATERIALS 1–2 (9th ed. 2005) (providing two pages on sole proprietorships);
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 2 (2000) (less than one page); WILLIAM A.
GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 31–34 (2d ed.
2005) (four pages); WILLIAM A. GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, UNINCORPORATED
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS INCLUDING AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 833–37 (3th ed. 2006) [hereinafter GREGORY &
HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS] (five pages); ROBERT W. HAMILTON &
RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS 250–52 (4th ed. 2006) (three pages); ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN
R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 8 (9th ed. 2005) (less than one page); CHARLES R.T.
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2, 14–15 (5th ed. 2006) (three pages); DANIEL Q. POSIN, CASES AND
ANALYSES ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES: A SOCRATIC
APPROACH (2005) (no pages); STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, NOTES AND QUESTIONS 68 (2005) (one page); ROBERT
A. RAGAZZO & DOUGLAS K. MOLL, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 2–3 (2006) (two pages); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V.
LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 5–6, 60 (4th ed. 2003) (three pages); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN,
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTITIES 10, 524–25 (3d ed. 2004) (three pages); JOEL
SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1–2, 27–28 (1995) (four pages).

3

Restatements and Model Codes exist for all types of business entities except the sole proprietorship. See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (2001) (outlining basic rules under model
partnership laws); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) (same); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914)
(same); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007) (outlining model corporation laws).

4

A terms and connectors search for “sole proprietorship” in the State Statutes database
(ST-ANN-ALL) on Westlaw shows that there is no state statute expressly enabling the
creation of a sole proprietorship, although there are some statutory provisions relating to
sole proprietorships. See also MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, AN INTRODUCTION TO AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS 1 (3d ed. 2000) (“A sole proprietorship is a business organization
that is owned by a single individual, and is not cast in a special legal form of organization,
such as a corporation, that can be utilized only by filing an organic document with the
state pursuant to an authorizing statute.”); RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 525 (discussing possible reasons why there are no statutes covering sole proprietorships); cf. UNIF. LTD.
P’SHIP ACT (2001) (outlining formal rules for setting up a limited partnership).
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5

the attention of some scholars. This Article is dedicated to exploring
6
the law’s treatment of the unincorporated sole proprietorship, espe7
cially as the alter ego of its owner, and to facilitating needed reform
of this important business form.
8
9
Sole proprietorships are vital to both the U.S. and world economies and are the most prevalent of all business forms in the United
10
States —as such, they deserve serious scrutiny. Small business is big
business; in 2004 alone, the IRS reported that all non-farm sole pro5

6

7
8

9

10

See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A Limited Liability Sole
Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 381 (proposing a model limited liability sole proprietorship act); Larry E. Ribstein, The Loneliest Number: The Unincorporated
Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship, 1 J. ASSET PROTECTION 46 (May/June 1996) (challenging the denial of limited liability protection to sole proprietors). See generally ALFRED F.
CONARD ET AL., AGENCY, ASSOCIATIONS, EMPLOYMENT AND PARTNERSHIPS: CASES,
STATUTES AND ANALYSIS 4–5, 9–10, 17 (4th ed. 1987) (providing background information
about sole proprietorships); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
UNINCORPORATED BUSINESSES AND CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND
CONCEPTS 29–49 (1996) (same); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 5–50 (9th ed. 2004)
(same).
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a sole proprietorship as “[a]
business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in
his or her personal capacity”); see also HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 29–30 (stating that a
sole proprietorship, also known as an “unincorporated proprietorship,” is the simplest
form for operating a business); DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 606 (1992) (defining a sole proprietorship as “a business owned
by an individual, as distinguished from ownership by a corporation, a partnership, or any
form of group ownership”). “An entrepreneur is an owner of a business who is personally
involved in its management and who shares in its profits or losses. Entrepreneurship
combines both ownership and management.” HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 29–30 (emphasis omitted).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.D. See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, A HISTORY OF SMALL BUSINESS IN
AMERICA (2d ed. 2003) (exploring the long history of small businesses’ contributions to
the U.S. economy, including sole proprietorships).
See, e.g., Neil Gregory & Stoyan Tenev, China’s Home-Grown Entrepreneurs, CHINA BUS. REV.
14 (Jan.-Feb. 2001), available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0101/
gregory.html (discussing the status of the sole proprietorship in China). In 1998, the
domestic private sector of China, including sole proprietorships, made up about 27% of
the nation’s gross domestic product (“GDP”). Id.; see also NAT’L COMMERCIAL BANK, IPO
BUSINESS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA 5 (2005), available at http://www.alahli
.com/personalbanking/er2005.asp (discussing the potential of converting sole proprietorships in Saudi Arabia into joint stock companies to raise capital through initial public
offerings). There are over 80,527 active sole proprietorships in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 6.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/cats/business_enterprise/sole_proprietorships_partnerships_corporations.html
(follow “Table 721” hyperlink) (reporting that in 2004, there were 20,591,000 non-farm
proprietorship tax returns filed, compared to 2,547,000 partnership and 5,558,000 corporate filings). Indeed, the number of sole proprietorship filings was more than double the
combined total of both corporate and partnership filings. See id.
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prietorships in the United States accounted for $1,140 billion in re11
ceipts and $248 billion in net income. The continued vitality of
small businesses and their contributions to the economy have re12
ceived national attention.
When looking closer at these statistics, one discovers two universes
of sole proprietors. One universe represents individuals already employed by other business entities, who operate sole proprietorships as
13
The other universe
an added source of income or as a hobby.
represents sole proprietors who operate their businesses as the sole
14
source of their income. Many of these businesses are often family15
run and located in inner-city and rural communities. They operate
their businesses as sole proprietorships despite the availability of legal
business entities, such as the corporation and the limited liability
16
company. As a result, sole proprietors fail to participate in what has

11

12

13

14
15

16

Id. Comparatively, the IRS reported that partnerships accounted for $3,142 billion in
receipts and $385 billion in net income, while corporations accounted for $21,717 billion
in receipts and $1,112 billion in net income. Id. But see SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 2 (“At
the same time the vast preponderance of business organizations—over 13.6 million sole
proprietorships, over 1.6 million partnerships, and over 3.5 million corporations—are not
on the Fortune 500 list.”).
See President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11. (“To make our economy stronger and more competitive, America must reward, not punish, the efforts and
dreams of entrepreneurs. . . . [S]o we must free small businesses from needless regulation
and protect honest job-creators from junk lawsuits.”); see also McRae C. Banks & Stephen
Taylor, Developing an Entrepreneur- and Small Business Owner-Defined Research Agenda, 29 J.
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 10 (1991) (summarizing a study on the “needs” and “problems” facing
entrepeneurs); Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1984) (focusing on tort reform as a means of supporting small business growth).
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS, http://www.census.gov/csd/
sbo/cbsummaryoffindings.htm (“Forty-two percent of owner-operated firms with no paid
employees and revenues of less than $5,000 operated their business to supplement their
income, compared to 7.0 percent of those with revenues of $1,000,000 or more.”).
See id.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10; Deborah L. Murphy, Understanding the Complexities
of Private Family Firms: An Empirical Investigation, 18 FAM. BUS. REV. 123, 124 (2005) (undertaking a study to “gain additional insight into the most important issues facing family
firms”); Melissa Carey Shanker & Joseph H. Astrachan, Myths and Realities: Family Businesses’ Contribution to the US Economy—A Framework for Assessing Family Business Statistics, 9
FAM. BUS. REV. 107, 114–15 (1996) (assessing the contribution of family businesses in the
United States to GDP and employment). While a study of sole proprietorship might also
raise issues of spousal interests, particularly in community-property states, this area is beyond the scope of this Article.
See infra Part V; see also JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 47 (2d ed.
2006) (noting that due to the preventive exposure that the sole proprietorship poses to
its owners, “there are far more sole proprietorships than there should be” (emphasis
omitted)).
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been described as “[o]ne of the law’s most economically significant
17
contributions to business life.” This is what is herein referred to as
“legal entity status,” or the “creation of fictional but legally recognized entities or ‘persons’ that are treated as having some of the at18
tributes of natural persons.” In addition, they are subject to un19
This Article is not about liability
shielded business liabilities.
shielding, although the creation of a sole proprietorship as a separate
legal entity may result in some liability-shielding aspects. Rather, this
20
Article focuses on the “mechanical efficiencies” of entity status.
Why does the law treat unincorporated sole proprietors differently
than all other business forms? Does sole proprietorship law disparately impact business owners who often reside at the bottom rung of
the socioeconomic ladder? What does an analysis of the sole proprietorship unveil about the true meaning and rise of the firm? The answers to these questions are viewed from the lens of Critical Class
Theory and what is referred to here as “unconscious classism.”
B. The Lens of Unconscious Classism and Critical Class Theory
Before outlining the direction of this Article, it is essential to present a perspective or lens through which sole proprietorship law will
be viewed. Overt racism and sexism have received substantial attention from constitutional theorists, including the excellent work done
21
under Critical Race Theory (“CRT”), Critical Feminist Theory

17

18
19
20
21

ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 15 (1986). See generally Gregory A. Mark,
Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1441 (1987) (discussing the development of the corporation as an autonomous legal entity in the American legal system).
CLARK, supra note 17, at 15.
See Crusto, supra note 5 (analyzing the issues relative to sole proprietors’ exposure to
business liabilities and presenting a case for a limited liability sole proprietorship statute).
CLARK, supra note 17, at 19. See infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race:
Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that anti-racist scholars generally misunderstand the relationship between racial
and other forms of oppression, and thus help perpetuate heterosexism); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1455 (2002) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?](criticizing “progressive race blindness” theory for failing to embrace race as an important dimension of identity); Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 330 (2006)
(suggesting that CRT should more adequately account for issues of class); Bailey Figler,
Note, A Vote for Democracy: Confronting the Racial Aspects of Felon Disenfranchisement, 61
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23

(“CFT”), and Critical Class Theory (“CCT”). In addition to analyzing and remedying overt acts of inequity, constitutional rights theorists have come to recognize the need to expand constitutional rights
theory beyond overt acts to redress unconscious and institutional
24
forms of rights violations. This Article seeks to contribute to Poverty
or Critical Class Theory of constitutional rights by presenting, in part,
a framework for analyzing social and economic discrepancies by focusing on the economic infrastructure, class divisions, and institutionalized inequities manifest within the United States.
CCT continues the work started by CRT and CFT, and in many
ways is consistent with these theories. CRT calls for legal discourse

22

23

24

N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 723 (2006) (discussing the problem of unconscious racism in
felon disenfranchisement).
See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Does Nothing Ever Change; Is Everything New?: Comments on the “To Do
Feminist Legal Theory” Symposium, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 415 (2003) (summarizing various works of CFT scholarship); Don S. Browning, Linda McClain’s The Place of Families
and Contemporary Family Law: A Critique from Critical Familism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1383 (2007)
(proposing a theory of “critical familism” to challenge trends in family law theory); Verna
L. Williams, Private Choices, Public Consequences: Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal
Theory, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563 (2006) (discussing public education from a
CFT perspective).
See, e.g., EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER,
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS (2005); MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW (2003); Clark Freshman, Foreword: Revisioning the Constellations of Critical Race Theory, Law and Economics, and Empirical
Scholarship, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2267 (2003) (suggesting an overlap between CRT and empirical studies of inequality); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005) (discussing discrimination in employment decisions); Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Well-Being of Women:
How Intersectionality Matters in Money Matters, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1181 (2006) (arguing that
feminist legal theory requires broader thinking about matters relating to women’s financial well-being); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996) (discussing disparate impact and class theory in the employment context); Rachel Bloomekatz,
Comment, Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage
Workplace, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1963 (2007) (analyzing the statutory remedies available for
U.S. workers to challenge employment discrimination in favor of immigrants).
See, e.g., Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman, Seeing the Old Lady: A New Perspective on the Age Old Problems of Discrimination, Inequality, and Subordination, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 263 (2007)
(arguing that current laws only address blatant racism and should be further refined); Ian
F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59
STAN. L. REV. 985 (2007) (discussing the history of colorblindness in the context of antidiscrimination law); Adam Winkler, The Federal Government as a Constitutional Niche in Affirmative Action Cases, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1931 (2007) (arguing that federal courts treat federal affirmative action laws more leniently than they do state laws); cf. Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (invalidating racial classifications in public school student assignment plans); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (upholding a public law school’s use of race in admissions decisions to maintain a
diverse student body).
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intending to uphold the rights of those who are disadvantaged be25
cause of their race. Similarly, CFT focuses on the social impact of
26
gender discrimination. However, these calls for legal discourse on
race and gender equality have not reached their potential because
the economic element of how or why there is racial and gender dis27
crimination is often not addressed. CCT hopes that by focusing on
the economic aspect of discrimination, one might understand that
various forms of discrimination are a by-product of class-based dis28
tinctions. CCT assesses political and economic factors, in addition
to social factors. One hopes that through the prism of CCT, various
aspects of unconscious and/or institutionalized inequities will be redressed, as sometimes inequities result from the mentality of indi29
viduals and the socio-economic impact of their prejudices. Through
the bi-focal lens of “unconscious classism,” combining CCT with recent theories of unconscious adverse behavior, this Article analyzes
sole proprietorship law as follows.
C. Overview of the Article
Through the lens of unconscious classism, this Article argues that
sole proprietorship law should be reformed to recognize the sole
proprietorship as a legal entity, separate from its owner, codifying its
30
entity status in a Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act (“USPA”). In
promoting the legal entity nature of the sole proprietorship, this Article seeks to achieve what is hereinafter referred to as “entity equality,” placing sole proprietors on equal footing with owners of other
25
26

27
28
29
30

See, e.g., Hutchinson, Progressive Race Blindness?, supra note 21, at 1477 (noting that critical
race theorists and critical legal scholars agree that rights are socially constructed).
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 22, at 569 (discussing the workings of inner city public
schools and how educational reform policies appear to condemn poor parents, who are
often single women).
See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 21, at 391 (discussing the interrelation between class and race
in critical race theory).
Id. at 389.
See, e.g., Hart, supra note 23, at 744 (explaining that in some contexts, discrimination may
be the result of individuals making subjective decisions).
There are, of course, other approaches to remedying the law’s unequal treatment of sole
proprietors, such as amending the definition of a general partnership to include a oneperson partnership, educating sole proprietors on the benefits of alternative legal forms
including incorporation and the limited liability company, and/or automatically granting
a sole proprietor partial entity status upon registering for a business license or a fictitious
name. The statutory approach, following the example of the Uniform Partnership Act
(“UPA”), would arguably result in the widest, most immediate means to redress the entity
issue. The author thankfully acknowledges University of Miami Law Professor Caroline
M. Bradley for raising the question of alternatives to statutory development.
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business enterprises—partners, shareholders, and limited liability
31
members.
Some critics will see this as another unwanted development in the
32
proliferation of legal entities, supporting the call for entity unifica33
tion. To the contrary, entity equality is consistent with the views of
business law scholars who challenge the call for entity rationalization
34
or simplification, arguing that form should follow function. Most
importantly, entity equality looks to “considerations of fairness, jus35
tice, or policy.”
Part I of this Article demonstrates the need to view the theory of
the firm from the sole proprietorship perspective and to develop a
critical class theory of constitutional law, as well as provides the thesis
and an overview. Part II demonstrates that the law currently views the
sole proprietorship solely as the alter ego of its owner (the “solitary
alter ego” view), how the solitary alter ego view legally disadvantages
sole proprietorships by treating them as individuals under common
law principles, and why the solitary alter ego view is antiquated and
ripe for reform. Part III analyzes the value of legal entity status, presents case law examples of the sophisticated nature of and probing
issues surrounding modern sole proprietorship law, and proposes
that the sole proprietorship should be treated as a legal entity for
some purposes, as is the law for all other business forms.
Part IV argues that current constitutional law principles are inadequate to remedy unconscious and institutional classism against
sole proprietors. Part V makes the public policy case for expanding
31

32
33

34
35

See infra Part II.B (discussing entity status of other legal enterprises). Also note that an
alternative to granting entity status to the sole proprietorship is to strip entity status from
the business enterprises that currently enjoy its benefits, including the corporation.
See generally Robert W. Hamilton, Entity Proliferation, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 859 (2004)
(analyzing the pros and cons of the recent growth in the variety of business entities).
See, e.g., Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The Next Generation,
29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 90–109 (2004) (suggesting the creation of a unified business organizations code).
See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Form and Function in Business Organizations, 58 BUS. L. 1433,
1443–48 (2003) (challenging the call for entity rationalization or simplification).
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 50 (5th ed. 2000). In
a critique of corporate law, Hamilton observes that:
The artificial entity theory has been criticized as being unrealistic and formalistic. . . . Professor Hohfeld summarized this view of the corporation in . . . Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions 197 (1923).
Hohfeld’s analysis illustrates the fallacy of accepting uncritically the “artificial
entity” theory. A corporation may be treated as an entity for many purposes but it
need not be treated as an entity for all purposes. . . . For this reason, arguments
grounded solely on the artificial entity theory and not supported by considerations
of fairness, justice, or policy have sometimes not prevailed.
Id. at 48–50.
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constitutional rights theory to redress the law’s unequal treatment of
sole proprietors. Part VI discusses the opposition to treating the sole
proprietorship as a legal entity and shows why the opposition is
wrong. Part VII concludes that the law should establish entity equality for sole proprietors by statutorily granting the sole proprietorship
legal entity status for some purposes in addition to alter ego status for
other purposes. Appendix A is a chart of the current entity features
of a sole proprietorship compared to those proposed in this Article.
Appendix B proposes the legal entity status features of a model sole
proprietorship statute, the Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act
(“USPA”), following the example of the National Conference of
36
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”). And Appendix C is a chart entitled “Distribution of Sole Proprietors and Their
Gross Receipts by Size of Proprietorship, Tax Year 2003.”
II. SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP LAW IS RIPE FOR REVIEW BECAUSE THE LAW
AND THE SOLITARY ALTER EGO VIEW TREAT THE SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP
AS INDISTINCT FROM ITS OWNER
This Part establishes that the law currently defines the sole proprietorship solely as the alter ego of its owner. It argues that this
definition legally disadvantages sole proprietors compared to business owners who choose other business forms. It demonstrates that
sole proprietorship law is currently seen as being indistinct from
other common law principles. And it argues that the solitary alter
ego view is antiquated and ripe for reform.
A. The Solitary Alter Ego Theory of Sole Proprietorships
Under the solitary ego view, a sole proprietorship has no separate
37
identity from its owner. A sole proprietor is solely entitled to all
36

37

NCCUSL’s treatment of the general partnership as a legal entity rather than as an aggregate of partners began in the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) (1914), and reached fruition in its independence of partners in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”)
(1994). See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 63 (“Much of the early case law adopted the aggregate theory, but almost all modern cases treat the partnership as a separate legal entity. UPA (1914) itself contains internal evidence that could be cited to support either
theory, but section 201 of UPA (1994) squarely adopts the modern entity view by simply
stating that ‘a partnership is an entity’ independent of its partners.” (footnote omitted)).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 39 (“From a legal standpoint, . . . in a proprietorship there
is no separation between personal and business affairs.”); LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 39
(6th ed. 2005) (“[T]he legal identity of the sole proprietorship and its owner are one and
the same . . . .”); The Basics of Sole Proprietorships, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
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profits from the business, subject to the rights of creditors, while
39
personally liable for all business debts and obligations, including all
contractual debts and all tort liabilities incurred by the sole proprie40
tor, her employees, and other agents in the business’s course. The
profits and losses of the business are reported on the personal income tax return of the owner, although a separate schedule must be
41
used.
Some courts have added to the solitary ego view in holding that
any judgment rendered against a sole proprietorship, separate from
42
its owner, is void. This non-entity view is further illustrated in rulings holding that the proper venue for actions brought against a sole
43
proprietorship is the venue where the proprietor is domiciled.
B. The Alter Ego View Legally Disadvantages Sole Proprietors
The solitary alter ego view hampers the effectiveness of the sole
proprietorship, making it a legally disadvantaged business form.
There are “mechanical efficienc[ies]” in “[t]he function of attribut44
ing powers to a fictional legal person.” Arguably, mechanical efficiencies result from two and, in some cases, thousands of partners or
45
shareholders acting as a single legal entity or person. One wonders
whether the converse is also true—that mechanical efficiencies might
also result from one person acting as two—which on the surface appears inefficient and contrary to logic.

38
39
40
41
42

43

44
45

startingabusiness/startupbasics/businessstructure/article77798.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2009) (presenting a simple description of sole proprietorships that assumes a solitary ego
view).
1 STEVEN C. ALBERTY, ADVISING SMALL BUSINESSES § 3:2, at 2 (2005).
EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1.
See id. at 2.
1 ALBERTY, supra note 38, § 4:2, at 1–2.
See, e.g., Patterson v. V & M Auto Body, 589 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (Ohio 1992) (voiding a
judgment against an auto body shop because the complaint named a sole proprietorship—“a nonentity”—rather than its proprietor); cf. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
671 (1896) (holding that a void judgment brought against a sole proprietorship does not
violate its proprietor’s double jeopardy rights).
See, e.g., Lee v. Xerox Corp., 387 S.E.2d 653, 653–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding venue
improper in county where realty company was located because its proprietor resided in a
different county); Dowis v. Watson, 289 S.E.2d 558, 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (“The county
of residence of a sole proprietorship is the county of residence of its proprietor.”).
CLARK, supra note 17, at 19–20 (“Legal personality effects a clear saving of transaction
costs, and the cumulative effect of these mundane savings is very great.”).
See id. (citing as an example “the ability of a corporation to own real estate in its own
name”).

228

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:2

One way to view mechanical efficiency is not by consolidation of
the number of actors but by the reduced cost of transactions. For example, it is likely that the solitary alter ego view restricts a sole proprietor’s ability to obtain credit in the business’s name. An illustration of the negative effect of this view is when a creditor who relies
solely on a business’s reported credit history successfully brings suit
against the sole proprietor individually for an unpaid business obliga46
tion, “[b]ecause a sole proprietorship has no legal identity apart
47
from its owner.” Such an approach may limit a sole proprietor’s
ability to effectuate credit in both her personal name and in the
business’s name, reducing the amount of total credit available and
eliminating the opportunity for the business to develop its own creditworthiness.
Another major advantage of legal entity status is “to minimize disruption and to preserve the going concern value of business ven48
tures.” Another downside of the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietorships is that the death of the owner results in the complete
dissolution of the business, disallowing a smooth continuation of the
49
business. “Insurance policies can protect a sole proprietor to some
degree, but liabilities in excess of insurance proceeds may be satisfied
50
from the sole proprietor’s own assets.” Should a sole proprietor
seek discharge from business obligations, the proprietor must declare
51
personal bankruptcy. Alternatively, if the sole proprietor files a personal bankruptcy petition, her individual assets and liabilities and her
52
business’s assets and liabilities will be adversely affected.
Under the solitary alter ego view, if the sole proprietorship has
been legally wronged, it is the proprietor and not the business who is
the appropriate plaintiff; if the business does wrong, the proprietor
53
and not the business is the proper defendant.
However,
46
47

48
49

50
51
52
53

HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 43.
Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431, 432, 435 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (“At
common law, sole proprietorships are not ‘legal entities.’ Neither are partnerships. . . . Rather, sole proprietorships and partnerships are deemed to be merely the alter egos of the proprietor or the partners (as individuals).” (quoting State v. ABC Towing,
954 P.2d 575, 577–78 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998))).
CLARK, supra note 17, at 20.
See 1 ALBERTY, supra note 38, § 3:13 (discussing succession plans for sole proprietorships
to avoid dissolution in the event of the proprietor’s death); HARRY J. HAYNSWORTH,
SELECTING THE FORM OF A SMALL BUSINESS ENTITY 3 (1985) (“Legally a sole proprietorship ceases to exist at the proprietor’s death.”).
9 MERTENS THE LAW OF FED INCOME TAX § 35A:05 (Supp. 2005).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 43.
Id.
Id. at 44–45.
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“[p]rocedural statutes or rules of court may set forth the appropriate
manner to name a [sole] proprietorship and its owner as a defen54
dant.” Accordingly, “in litigation involving a [sole] proprietorship it
is customary in many jurisdictions to use the dba (doing business as)
55
designation when bringing suit on a business obligation.”
In summary, under the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietorship, a sole proprietor is legally disadvantaged in that, without further
action, she is unable to own property in her business’s name, obtain
credit in her business’s name, sue or be sued in her business’s name,
avoid personal liability for her business’s contract and tort liability,
and segregate the business’s tax liability from her own personal tax
56
liability. Hence, the solitary alter ego view increases mechanical inefficiency, adds transaction costs, reduces savings, and maximizes disruption, thereby seriously restricting the ability of a sole proprietor to
compete with an owner who is using other legal business forms.
C. The Law Also Fails to Distinguish Sole Proprietorship Law from Other
Common Law Principles
57

Currently, sole proprietorship law is intertwined with agency law,
perhaps in recognition of the important role that agency law plays in
the operation of sole proprietorships (although no more than in the
operation of other types of business enterprises). “Under common
law rules, a ‘sole proprietorship is created by the mutual assent of
proprietor and agent,’ under which agency law imposes on the agent
a fiduciary duty of loyalty with no corresponding duty on the proprie58
tor.” When receiving scholarly treatment, sole proprietorship law is
usually relegated to an introduction to agency law, as if they are one
59
and the same.
54
55
56

57
58
59

Id. at 45.
Id.
See generally RIEVA LESONSKY, START YOUR OWN BUSINESS: THE ONLY START-UP BOOK
YOU’LL EVER NEED (2d ed. 2001); MICHAEL SPADACCINI, ULTIMATE BOOK ON FORMING
CORPORATIONS, LLC’S, SOLE PROPRIETORSHIPS, AND PARTNERSHIPS (2004).
See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1 (discussing sole proprietorships under the rubric of
agency law).
Crusto, supra note 5, at 395 (quoting Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 227 (1992)).
See, e.g., RAGAZZO & MOLL, supra note 2, at 2 (stating that “[a]lthough agency law applies
to all forms of business, it is frequently invoked when dealing with the most basic (and
most common) form—the sole proprietorship”); RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10 (“The relationships between the owner and the other inputs in a sole proprietorship are not covered in a separate business association statute . . . . [T]he most important body of case law
that applies to this type of firm [is] the common law of agency . . . .”); SELIGMAN, supra
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Sole proprietorship law is often seen as indistinguishable from
60
and governed by common law default rules. For example, sole pro61
prietors are subject to general rules of tort liability. “Under the
common law, a person has three sources of liability: direct, vicarious,
62
and liability resulting from a sole proprietorship’s fiduciary duties.”
Therefore, as long as the voluntary act has some causal link with the
harm caused to the victim, the intent or negligence of the sole pro63
prietor is irrelevant.
While common rules and principles of tort, contract, and agency
law apply to all business entities, this does not negate the need to
identify and codify unique rules and principles that govern and regu64
late sole proprietors.
D. The Current Views of a Sole Proprietorship Are Ripe for Reform
The law’s current views of the sole proprietorship are ripe for reform. As the most used and extremely valuable business form in the
United States, often from the perspective of both the sole proprietor
and the outside world, a sole proprietorship is treated as an entity
separate and distinct from its owner. As a result, a sole proprietorship should be viewed as a legal entity for at least “titling” purposes,
such as conveying business property in the business name, obtaining
credit in the business name including establishing separate business
creditor priorities from those of the sole proprietor’s individual
creditors, issuing financial instruments on behalf of the business, suing and being sued for business matters in the business’s name, transferring ownership of the business in the business name, and permitting the business to continue beyond the death of the sole proprietor.

60
61

62
63
64

note 2, at 27 (“The source of the most significant legal principles for the sole proprietorship is the law of agency.”).
Crusto, supra note 5, at 390.
John H. Matheson, Choice of Organizational Form for the Start-Up Business, 1 MINN. J. BUS. L.
& ENTREPRENEURSHIP 7, 8 (2002) (“The substantive law of . . . torts . . . govern[s] the sole
proprietorship, including the personal liability of the owner for the obligations of the
business.”).
Crusto, supra note 5, at 390.
Id.
See discussion infra Part III (making the case for a uniform sole proprietorship statute).
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1. The Sole Proprietorship Is the Most Used Type of Business Enterprise,
Has Great Economic Significance, and Has Historical and
International Significance
Given that the sole proprietorship is the most prevalent business
65
form in this country, sole proprietorship law is worth reviewing for
the sake of both sole proprietors and the attorneys who represent
66
them. As mentioned briefly in the Introduction, the sole proprietorship is the simplest form of business type, requiring merely con67
ducting a business owned and often operated by one person. A sole
proprietorship can also result by operation of law from a defective
solely-owned corporation, a defective solely-owned limited liability
company, or a formerly-two-person-owned partnership where one
partner disassociates (perhaps by death) and the surviving partner
68
continues the business.
While sole proprietorship total revenue is dwarfed by that of cor69
porations, the sole proprietorship business form is used to operate
70
large as well as small business enterprises. They are greatly used in
the service industry, with the largest numbers and producing the
most significant net income and are also used in agriculture, forestry,
71
and fishing, and in wholesale and retail trade. For these reasons, it
is essential that sole proprietorship law be further explored.

65
66
67

68

69

70

71

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10.
See generally 1 ALBERTY, supra note 38.
See id. § 3:2 (stating that all that is necessary to create a sole proprietorship is the sole
proprietor’s desire to enter into business); Nolo.com, Sole Proprietorship Basics,
http://www.nolo.com/article.cfm/objectID/3FD19141-DB91-4FCA-BDB93416A4D05479
/111/182/147/ART (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (stating that the sole proprietorship is the
simplest legal structure for those going into business on their own).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 5 (noting that not all business forms result from conscious
and rational selection by their owner and legal counsel, and that the law provides for default forms for business).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 8 (stating that “the cumulative receipts of the ten largest
corporations exceeded the gross receipts of the 15 million-odd proprietorships”); Biz
Stats, Free Business Statistics and Financial Ratios Site Map, http://www.bizstats.com/
business.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (showing that corporations account for a large
percentage (85%) of total business revenues in the United States in 2003); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, supra note 10 (showing that in 2004, there were over 1 million corporations with
over $1 million in business receipts compared to only 109,000 non-farm proprietorships
with the same amount of business receipts).
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 10, at 485 (“A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated business owned by one person and may include large enterprises with many employees and hired managers and part-time operators.”).
CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 9–10 (referencing 1980 figures from the Statistical Abstract
of the United States, 1986).
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2. “Sole Proprietorship” Is Often a Misnomer for a Larger Business
Enterprise and Sometimes for a Large Enterprise
Perhaps the greatest reason for treating the sole proprietorship as
a legal entity for some purposes is because it is a larger business enterprise than its name suggests. That is, when one takes an economic
overview of the sole proprietorship, one uncovers that the sole proprietorship, while legally owned by one person, is often a family-run
72
73
business, employing family members as functional, partial owners.
The sole proprietorship’s use of family members is a profitable strat74
egy and sometimes a questionable means of avoiding tax liability.
Consequently, “[t]he line between employees and owners (or poten75
tial owners) of a business is sometimes not clear cut.” From this
brief discussion of the sometimes familial nature of the sole proprietorship, one can easily see that sole proprietorships are often more
than mere alter egos of their apparent, named owners.
Whether or not it is a family-owned business, a sole proprietorship
is sometimes a large economic enterprise involving many non76
relatives. A sole proprietor typically will not conduct the business by
herself, but will engage various people such as salespersons, mechan77
ics, and attorneys to act on her behalf and subject to her control. In
applying contract entity or agency analysis to the sole proprietor78
ship, one quickly discovers that the sole proprietorship represents a
72

73

74
75
76

77
78

See generally PAT B. ALCORN, SUCCESS AND SURVIVAL IN THE FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS
(1982) (discussing the influence and participation of families in small, privately owned
businesses); Louis B. Barnes & Simon A. Hershon, Transferring Power in the Family Business,
HARVARD BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1976, at 105, 105–14 (describing the organization of family
businesses and the challenges of transferring ownership from one generation to the
next).
Bruce A. Kirchhoff & Judith J. Kirchhoff, Family Contributions to Productivity and Profitability
in Small Businesses, 25 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 25, 26 (1987) (exploring “the effects of family
involvement on productivity and profitability” on family businesses); see also Shanker &
Astrachan, supra note 15, at 112–14 (discussing the role of family members in sole proprietorships).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 36–37 (reporting that a 1992 study showed that hiring
employees creates large tax obligations for employers).
Id. at 37.
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that a sole proprietorship “may be large and
complex, involving many people other than the owner, and can plainly be an ‘organization’ in the nonlegal sense of the term”).
EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 2 (explaining further that the law of agency facilitates the sole
proprietor’s bidding).
See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 9–12 (2003) (comparing the transactional cost theory of
the firm as a set of transactions of cost-reducing relationships to Ronald Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
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nexus of economic and business interests. Through the use of outside agents via contracts, the sole proprietor often reduces internal
79
operating overhead.
As such, the sole proprietorship may have
80
some advantages over other types of business enterprise.
In summary, the sole proprietorship is the most-used business
form in the United States, makes significant contributions to the
economy, often involves family members, and sometimes is a large
business that employs many non-relative agents. For these and other
reasons, one can conclude that the law should consider a more sophisticated view of the sole proprietorship. From all of the above, it is
posited that the sole proprietorship should be viewed as the alter ego
of its owner for some purposes and as a legal entity for titling purposes.
III. THE SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A LEGAL ENTITY
FOR TITLING PURPOSES
Part III proposes that the sole proprietorship should be viewed as
a legal entity for titling purposes and as an alter ego of its owner for
other purposes. It analyzes the value of legal entity status, presents
case law examples of the sophisticated nature of and probing issues
surrounding modern sole proprietorship law, and suggests that entity
equality requires that the sole proprietorship be treated as a legal entity for titling purposes comparable to all other business forms.
A. Legal Entity Status Has Great Value to Business Associations
Legal entity status, or entity status, is one of the most significant
81
and most ignored features of business life. As previously mentioned,
entity status is “the creation of fictional but legally recognized entities
or ‘persons’ that are treated as having some of the attributes of natu-

79

80

81

INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985))); Michael C. Jenson & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (analyzing firm ownership structure through theories of agency, property rights, and finance).
See Poznak Law Firm Ltd., Doing Business as a Sole Proprietor, http://www.poznaklaw
.com/articles/solep.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (explaining how the operation of a
business as a sole proprietorship can help the owner avoid double taxation of income).
See DANIEL WM. FESSLER, ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF
PROFIT: CASES AND MATERIALS ON PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS, JOINT VENTURES
AND RELATED AGENCY CONCEPTS 4–6 (3d ed. 1991) (describing such advantages).
CLARK, supra note 17, at 15. See generally Mark, supra note 17 (discussing the the development of the corporation as an autonomous legal entity in the American legal system).
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82

ral persons.” An “unincorporated entity” is defined as “an organization or artificial legal person that either has a separate legal existence
or has the power to acquire an estate in real property in its own
name . . . . includ[ing] a general partnership, limited liability company, limited partnership, business trust, joint stock association and
83
incorporated nonprofit association.”
In order to appreciate the benefits that legal entity status would
bring to the sole proprietorship, one need only look at the value of
entity status to other business entities. For example, general partnerships have certain entity features: the power to sue or be sued in the
partnership name, the right to hold and convey title to property in
the partnership name, and the ability to provide for continuation of
the partnership by contract even when the partnership technically
84
dissolves because of a change in membership.
Entity status results from state statutory authority as represented in
the following examples. First, under state incorporation statutes, a
corporation as a separate legal entity has separate rights, powers, and
liabilities separate from those who own or manage it. A corporate entity can own and hold title to property, and is liable for its debts. Additionally, the continued existence of a corporation is unaffected by
85
changes in its shareholders and is liable for its debts. Second, comparatively, although both the Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”) and
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (“RUPA”) fail to expressly define the term “entity,” the UPA views a general partnership in part as
86
87
a legal entity while the RUPA does so in whole. Third, under the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, “[a] limited liability com88
pany is a legal entity distinct from its members.” And fourth, under
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, a limited partnership is de82
83
84

85
86
87

88

CLARK, supra note 17, at 15.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.40(24A) (3d. ed. Supp. 2000).
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 6–7. See generally Gary S. Rosin, The Entity-Aggregate
Dispute: Conceptualism and Functionalism in Partnership Law, 42 ARK. L. REV. 395, 397–401
(1989) (discussing the legal-person conceptual approach and the functional approach to
partnership relationships).
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 7.
See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (“UPA”) §§ 8(3), 9(1), 25, 40(h) (1914) (considering a partnership
as a legal entity under these sections).
See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (“RUPA”) §§ 101(10), 201(a), 307(a) (1997). Section 201(a)
states: “A partnership is an entity distinct from its partners.” In addition, under § 307(a),
"[a] partnership may sue and be sued” in its own name. Furthermore, § 101(10) defines
“person” as “an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or
any other legal or commercial entity.”
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (1996).
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fined as “an entity, having one or more general partners and one or
more limited partners, which is formed under this [Act] by two or
89
more persons . . . .” Furthermore, as an entity, a limited partnership
90
is distinct from its partners.
Legal entity status allows a business enterprise mechanical efficiencies to save money, operate more effectively, and arguably be
more profitable. With needs similar to businesses organized under
other legal forms, there is no good reason why sole proprietorships
should be denied statutory benefits similar to those granted to other
legal entities.
B. The Complexity of Modern Issues Facing the Sole Proprietorship Requires
That It Be Granted Legal Entity Status in Some Circumstances
Compared to owners of other business forms, sole proprietors
face the same business challenges, have unique legal issues, and require distinctive applications of common law rules. The following
discussion shows that sole proprietorship law is distinct from general
common law principles; and, as a result, sole proprietorship law requires statutory recognition.
1. The Sole Proprietorship Is a Distinct Body of Law, Raising Unique
Legal Issues, Rules, and Principles
Like all business types, the sole proprietorship is subject to certain
common law rules. And, like other business types, the sole proprie91
torship possesses distinctive legal issues, rules, and principles. Noting comparative differences with a general partnership, a limited
partnership, and a corporation, a sole proprietorship has the following attractions and distractions:

89
90
91

UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 102(11) (2001) (brackets in original).
Id. § 104(a).
See, e.g., CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 10 (noting that “[a]lthough proprietorships are
the most numerous form of business organization, there is no distinctive body of law
about them. One does not find any treatises or digest titles devoted to them. . . . But sole
proprietors do have their problems, both as their duties and as to their rights”); FESSLER,
supra note 80, at 4–6 (describing the many advantages of not incorporating); HAMILTON,
supra note 5, at 29–41 (discussing essential terms and concepts of unincorporated businesses and closely held corporations); CHESTER A. ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE
AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 2.02, 2.04 (1989) (discussing the characteristics and
advantages of individual proprietorship and limited partnerships); Crusto, supra note 5,
at 387–89 (providing a list of twenty-eight unique characteristics of sole proprietorships);
cf. RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 10 (explaining that the most important body of case law applying to sole proprietorships is the common law of agency).
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(1) No documentation or filing essential for existence;
(2) No initial and annual franchise or license tax;
(3) Owners are individually liable for business debts;
(4) Judicial proceedings are in the name of the individual owner;
(5) Transfer of ownership requires conveyancing formalities;
(6) Ownership and authority are terminated by the death of the
proprietor;
(7) Distributed profits are taxed only as income of the members;
(8) Enterprise profits are taxed as the income of members even
though they are undistributed; and
(9) Enterprise losses are offset against the members’ individual
92
taxable incomes.
Based on these features, compared to other business enterprises,
one might conclude that the sole proprietorship is most similar to the
general partnership, except that a general partnership is composed
of two or more persons while a sole proprietorship is composed of
93
only one person. As noted above, as a general partnership is both a
legal entity separate from its partner owner and a legal aggregate of
partners, there is no reason why a sole proprietorship could not exist
separately from the sole proprietor. Inquiring into the case law
might provide some insight into the complex and distinctive nature
of sole proprietorship law.
The following survey is a brief, non-exhaustive study of the case
law concerning the sole proprietorship. The author believes that this
survey is sufficient evidence that sole proprietorship law exists as a
separate body of law, distinct from general common law principles
and other business forms. While the majority of the following cases
follow the solitary alter ego view of sole proprietorships, the courts
often grapple with sole proprietorships as legal entities and the decisions illustrate the inequity of treating sole proprietors differently
from owners of other business associations.
a. Sole Proprietorship as Alter Ego of the Sole Proprietor
94

A Texas case illustrates that despite the truism that a sole proprietorship is the alter ego of the sole proprietor, courts sometimes
grapple with the reality that a sole proprietorship is often operated as
a separate business enterprise under an assumed name:

92
93
94

CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 4–5.
See id.
Holberg & Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Assurance Co., 856 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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[A] plaintiff brought suit against Holberg & Co., a [sole] proprietorship
owned by Robert E. Holberg, naming as the defendant only the business
in its assumed name. After obtaining a judgment for over $90,000, the
plaintiff moved to add Robert E. Holberg’s name individually to the
judgment. The trial court did so and Robert E. Holberg appealed on the
ground there was no evidence indicating he was personally responsible
for the debt. Not only did the appellate court affirm the trial court’s action . . . , but it also sanctioned the defendant’s attorney for filing a frivo95
lous appeal taken “for delay and without sufficient cause.”

According to the court, the “[c]ompany was, in law and in fact,
one and the same as Holberg, because the sole proprietorship has a
96
legal existence only in the identity of Holberg.”
b. Constitutional Duty to Treat Sole Proprietors and Corporate Officers
Equally
97

In assessing the application of § 17a(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act
to sole proprietors, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the right of
sole proprietors to equal treatment with corporate officers. In United
States v. Sotelo, the Court held that the principal officer and majority
shareholder of a corporation had to pay underpaid taxes after declar98
ing bankruptcy in accordance with § 17a(1)(e).
The Court explained that the overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act of giving bankrupt corporations a “fresh start” does not override Congress’s specific
intent in § 17 a(1)(e) to make liability for unpaid taxes nondischargeable, particularly because a contrary result “would have the
effect of allowing a corporation and its officers to escape all liability
for unpaid withholding taxes while leaving liable for such taxes after
bankruptcy those individuals who do business in the sole proprietor-

95
96

97

98

HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 41 (quoting and discussing Holberg, 856 S.W.2d at 515).
Holberg, 856 S.W.2d at 518; accord Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431,
435–36 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a sole proprietorship was essentially a trade
name that its owner operated, and thus, the owner was personally liable for judgments
against the trade name).
Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 2, 80 Stat. 270 (1966) (repealed, but amending 11
U.S.C. 35 § 17(a)(1)(e)) (making nondischargeable in bankruptcy “any taxes . . . which
the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . , but has not paid over”). This
provision has typically been applied in conjunction with § 6672 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides that if “[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and
pay over” federal taxes “willfully fails” to do so, that person shall be liable for a “penalty”
equal to the amount of the taxes in question. I.R.C. § 6672 (2000).
436 U.S. 268 (1978).
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ship or partnership, rather than the corporate, form.” Thus, sole
proprietors, like corporate officials, were liable for unpaid taxes un100
der the Act.
While the Sotelo dissent opposed holding corporate officials liable
101
under § 17a(1)(e), the majority believed that discharging corporate
officials from liability but still holding sole proprietors liable would
102
result in a tremendous injustice to the ordinary businessman. The
majority noted that in passing § 17a (1) “Congress was expressly concerned about the fact that the operation of prior law was ‘unfairly
103
discriminatory against . . . the unincorporated small businessman.’”
Indeed, “Congress recognized that a bankrupt corporation ‘dissolves
and goes out of business,’ thereby avoiding IRS tax claims; it was
thought inequitable that a sole proprietor or other individual would
104
remain liable after bankruptcy for the same type of claims.”
According to the Court, “This inequity between a corporate officer and
[a sole proprietor], both of whom have a similar liability to the Government, frequently would turn on nothing more than whether the
individual was ‘sophisticated’ enough ‘to, in effect, incorporate him105
self.’”
Therefore, Congress’s concern about eliminating corporations’ unfair advantage over the sole proprietor played a huge part in
106
the Sotelo majority’s holding. Sotelo shows that the Court recognizes
the need to evaluate equality issues when applying laws to different
business types.

99

100
101
102
103
104

105
106

Id. at 279–81 (citation omitted). The Court also noted that the legislative history of
§ 17a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act “provides . . . support for the view that respondent’s liability should be held nondischargeable.” Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 291–92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 281.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 88-372, at 2 (1965)).
Id. (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13,817 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin), and citing 112
CONG. REC. 13,821 (letter to Senators from Sens. Ervin and Hruska); 112 CONG. REC.
13,822 (statement of Sen. Hruska); Letter from Edward Gudeman, Under Sec’y of Commerce, to Hon. James O. Eastland, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in S.
REP. NO. 89-114, at 12 (1965); Memorandum from W. Randolph Montgomery, Chairman
of the Nat’l Bankruptcy Conference, to Senators, reprinted in S. REP. NO. 89-114, at 16
(1965); S. REP. NO. 88-1134, at 2 (1964); H.R. REP. NO. 86-735, at 2 (1959)).
Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 281 (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13,817 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin)).
See id.
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c. Exploring the Alter Ego Theory in the Criminal Law Context
The criminal law generally treats a sole proprietorship and its
107
owner as one. Yet there are exceptional instances where the criminal law has diverged from the solitary alter ego view and held a sole
proprietor and his business to be separate entities. The following examples are instances wherein the robbery of a sole proprietor and his
business were counted as two separate actions of robbery. In McKinley
108
v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a defendant’s convictions for two counts of armed robbery. The defendant had taken
money from a pharmacy’s cash register and the wallet and wristwatch
of its sole proprietor. The court concluded that these two takings did
not fall within the “single larceny doctrine,” and therefore separate
109
convictions were proper.
110
Similarly, in Pagan v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals found
that a sole proprietor and his business were separate entities. The
court considered a convicted defendant’s claim that the State failed
to prove robbery as alleged in the charging information. The defendant robbed a video rental store by threatening the proprietor with a
knife until she gave him money from the cash register and a moneybag under the counter. The video store was operated as a sole pro111
prietorship. The defendant was charged with robbery with a deadly
weapon, which requires proof that the defendant “took property
from another person, or from the presence of another person, by using or threatening the use of force or by putting any person in fear,
112
while armed with a deadly weapon.”
The written charge was not
phrased in terms of taking property “from the presence of another
107

108
109
110
111
112

This concept has been universally recognized in numerous jurisdictions and applied in
distinct criminal law cases. Several courts have held that that the sole proprietorship does
not qualify as an “organization” under criminal statutes and, thus, is not a separate legal
entity that may be held liable. See, e.g., Masonoff v. State, 546 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that the existence of a separate address or telephone number for a sole
proprietorship does not create an “organization” sufficiently separate from the proprietor
for him to be held liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”)); State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a sole
proprietorship is not an “organization” for purposes of an anti-pollution statute and thus
cannot be held liable for the illegal discharge of pollutants by one of its employees); State
v. Worsencroft, 653 N.E.2d 746 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a sole proprietorship
is not an “organization” for purposes of a federal Medicaid statute and thus cannot he
held criminally liable).
400 N.E.2d 1378 (Ind. 1980).
Id. at 1379.
809 N.E.2d 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 919.
Id. at 918 (citing IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1 (West 2009).
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person, but from a person, namely Hardinsburg Video, owned by
113
Judy McIntyre.”
The defendant argued that the State failed to
prove that Hardinsburg Video was a “person” that could be robbed
because the Indiana Criminal Code did not expressly define “person”
114
to include sole proprietorships.
Relying on the McKinley decision
and, in the alternative, the definition of a sole proprietorship, the
court concluded that a sole proprietorship could qualify as a “person”
115
under the statute and affirmed the conviction.
Neither McKinley nor Pagan required the recognition of any separate legal status for a sole proprietorship. In McKinley, the court prac116
It
tically viewed the robbery incident as two separate episodes.
noted that, after the defendant first stole money from the cash register, his actions “took on a different character” when he ordered the
store owner to turn over his wallet and wristwatch, and kicked him in
117
the face. In upholding the two convictions, the court did not rely
118
on any notion that two separate entities owned the stolen items.
The court expressly noted that the rule it applied did not require
“that the business entity be a separate ‘person’ as is a corporation or
119
partnership.”
Rather, the court merely concluded that the defendant’s actions had caused different types of injuries to a single indi120
vidual.
The Pagan court cited McKinley for the proposition that a sole
proprietorship could be a crime victim, separate and distinct from its
121
This limited distinction, however, stems from McKinley’s
owner.
recognition that a single business owner may suffer from a robbery in
122
two different capacities.
The Pagan court provided an alternative

113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

122

Id. at 918–19 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 919.
Id. (noting that the McKinley court “was not asked to consider whether a sole proprietorship fell under the legal definition of ‘person’ in the Criminal Code”).
400 N.E.2d at 1379.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. (explaining that the defendant “wronged an individual by robbing both that individual and that individual’s business”).
Pagan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 915, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“We are satisfied, though, that a
sole proprietorship may qualify as a ‘person’ that can be the victim of a crime. Our supreme court clearly held that a sole proprietorship may be a crime victim, separate and
distinct from the business owner, in McKinley v. State . . . .”).
See id. (explaining that McKinley held that “two separate crimes were committed when the
defendant robbed ‘both [an] individual and that individual’s business’” (quoting
McKinley, 400 N.E.2d at 1379)).
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rationale for its decision that relied on the universally recognized
123
status of a sole proprietorship as legally indistinct from its owner.
d. Alter Ego Theory Applied in Standard “Non-Owned Auto
Exception” in Business Liability Insurance Policies
The sole proprietorship and its proprietor are also considered
124
one and indistinguishable in the context of insurance policies. This
concept is illustrated in numerous cases involving the standard “nonowned auto exception” in business liability insurance policies. In
125
Bledsoe v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., an Indiana federal court
opined as to whether the exception applied to a vehicle owned by the
sole proprietor of an insured business. The issue was whether the
sole proprietor’s business liability insurance policy provided insurance coverage for the unsatisfied portion of the judgment owed to
126
the plaintiff by the proprietor himself.
In Bledsoe, a sole proprietor’s son caused a car accident that in127
jured the plaintiff. The sole proprietorship’s insurance policy generally excluded coverage for damages arising from the use of auto-

123

124

125
126
127

The Pagan court stated:
We note in the alternative that the definition of “sole proprietorship” is “[a]
business in which one person owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her own personal capacity.” Under this definition, it is clear that
stealing property from a sole proprietorship business is tantamount to stealing
from the individual owner of the business, who necessarily owns all of the business’
property. This is so even if, under McKinley, it is possible to be convicted of two
separate counts of robbery if a defendant forcibly takes both clearly identifiable
“business” property and “individual” property. Here, the only property Pagan took
was clearly identifiable with the Hardinsburg Video business. As such, we conclude that although the State was only entitled to charge Pagan with one count of
robbery, it could allege and prove the taking of property from the “person” of
Hardinsburg Video, which property was also necessarily the property of [its proprietor], a human being.
Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1398
(7th ed. 1999)).
This concept has been universally recognized in numerous jurisdictions and applied in
distinct tort liability cases. See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins.
Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a sole proprietorship had
no existence apart from its proprietor, and thus business liability coverage excluded an
automobile titled to the proprietor); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d 342 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that a vehicle titled in a sole proprietorship’s name was owned by its
proprietor, and thus did not fall within the non-owned auto exception of the proprietor’s
insurance policy); Samples v. Ga. Mut. Ins. Co., 138 S.E.2d. 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1964)
(holding that a vehicle purchased under the name of a sole proprietorship was also
owned by the proprietor).
No. 1:04 CV 1584 DFH-TAB, 2005 WL 2491577 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 7, 2005).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *2.
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mobiles, including those owned by the insured, but it also contained
a non-owned auto exception to that exclusion that referred to the
128
named insured.
Thus, the sole proprietorship’s non-owned auto
exception provided coverage only for vehicles not owned by the
129
named insured, the sole proprietorship.
The vehicle involved in
130
the accident belonged to the proprietor individually. As a sole proprietorship is often legally indistinguishable from its proprietor, the
vehicle was considered as one owned by the named insured, the sole
131
proprietorship.
Consequently, the business liability exclusion ap132
The court
plied to exclude coverage for the proprietor’s claims.
held that the insurance company owed no duty to defend or indem133
nify the sole proprietorship under the business liability policy.
In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the widely recognized
characteristics of the sole proprietorship and treated the insured sole
proprietorship and its proprietor, the vehicle’s owner, as legally the
134
same person.
135
In Trombley v. Allstate Insurance Co., a proprietor argued that his
sole proprietorship was a distinct legal entity from himself for pur136
poses of a business coverage exception in his insurance policy. The
exception precluded any insurance coverage for damages arising out
of the use of any vehicle owned by the insured while used for business
137
purposes. The court found that the proprietor was the same legal
138
Thus, the vehicle owned by the sole
entity as his proprietorship.
proprietorship, which was involved in a car wreck during business
139
hours, was also owed by the proprietor himself. The court reasoned
128
129
130

131
132
133
134

135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id. at *1, *5 (suggesting that “[state] courts would not distinguish between the sole proprietorship and its owner, so that a vehicle owned by the business owner would be
deemed owned by the insured business”); see also CU Lloyd’s of Tex. v. Hatfield, 126
S.W.3d 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (reaching the same conclusion based on similar facts).
Bledsoe, 2005 WL 2491577, at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. Most courts addressing this issue in reported decisions under similar sets of facts have
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d
342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Hall v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 711 (Neb. 2003);
Recalde v. ITT Hartford, 492 S.E.2d 435 (Va. 1997).
640 So.2d 815 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 817; see also Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 902 (N.D. 1985) (reversing
trial court’s holding that a proprietor was a seperate entity from his businesses).
Trombley, 640 So.2d at 817.
Id.
Id.
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that a proprietor who enters into a contract (i.e. an insurance policy)
under a trade name has no separate legal existence from the sole
140
proprietorship in whose name that contract is made.
In reaching
its conclusion, the court relied on Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
Article 736, which provides: “A person who does business under a
trade name is the proper defendant in an action to enforce an obliga141
tion created by or arising out of the doing of such business.”
The Trombley court stated further that Louisiana courts have consistently held that a suit brought against the owner in the trade name
used was sufficient to justify rendition of judgment against the own142
er. Therefore, the policy’s business coverage exception applied and
143
precluded the proprietor from insurance coverage.
e. Dissenting Opinion Recognizes the Inequity of Exempting Sole
Proprietors from Statutory Immunity for Negligent Supervision
Liability Granted to Corporations and Partnerships
Some judges recognize the inequity of statutory provisions that
benefit corporations and partnerships but provide the same benefits
144
to sole proprietors. For example, in Madden v. Aldrich, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a sole proprietor was not entitled to statutory immunity, which extended to corporations and partnerships,
from liability for negligent supervision of persons not in privity of
contract with the plaintiffs, and therefore could be held liable for his
employee’s misconduct. But a strong dissent recognized the anomaly
of extending limited liability to firms but not to sole proprietors for
145
acts of subordinates.
The dissent found that the disparate treat140

141
142
143
144
145

Id.; see also Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 1381, 1387 (D. Neb. 1977) (observing that “[t]he individual who does business as a sole proprietor under one or several
names remains one person, personally liable for all his obligations”); Nat’l Sur. Co. v.
Okla. Presbyterian Coll. for Girls, 132 P. 652, 654 (Okla. 1913) (suggesting that doing
business under another name does not create an entity distinct from the person operating that business); Holberg & Co. v. Citizens Nat’l Assurance Co., 856 S.W.2d 515, 516–18
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a judgment rendered against a sole proprietorship is
binding upon the proprietor contracting under the assumed name of the proprietorship).
Trombley, 640 So. 2d at 817 (citing LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 736).
Id.
Id. at 817–18.
58 S.W.3d 342 (Ark. 2001).
Id. at 360 (Imber, J., dissenting) (citing Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 42 S.W.3d 496
(Ark. 2001)) (noting that a literal interpretation of the applicable statute, which denies
negligent supervision liability to partnerships and corporations yet holds sole proprietorships liable for the same, leads to “absurd consequences” that are clearly contrary to legislative intent).
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ment of sole proprietorships and corporations regarding negligent
146
supervision liability was extremely inequitable.
Moreover, the dissent felt that the majority’s holding would “open the floodgates to law
suits against partners, members, and officers of legal business organizations by imposing liability on them for negligent or fraudulent actions taken by even the most junior attorney in the firm where the
147
plaintiffs lack contractual privity with anyone in the firm.”
* * *
This case and the others cited illustrate that sole proprietorship
law is not merely the same as general common law principles and requires recognition as being distinct and unique. The case law also
shows that the solitary alter ego view is not always the only view the
law has of sole proprietorships: the law sometimes finds a sole proprietor as being separate from its business entity. The case law further shows that the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts recognize
that the law sometimes treats sole proprietors inequitably compared
to other business owners. Finally, the case law also shows that sole
proprietors face sophisticated challenges that require attentive specialized legal considerations.
C. The Sole Proprietorship Deserves Entity Equality
As evidenced above, the alter ego theory of sole proprietorship
law is currently ill-equipped to meet the complex challenges of effectively doing business in the modern world. If society seeks to support
the growth and development of small businesses, it should support a
broader view of sole proprietorships. This Article presents one approach to doing so, that is, by providing the sole proprietorship with
legal entity status for titling purposes. To do so would achieve what is
hereinafter referred to as “entity equality,” placing sole proprietors
on equal footing with the owners of other business enterprises, part148
ners, shareholders, and limited liability members.
Hypothetically,
an alternative means of achieving equity equality would be to strip legal entity status from other business enterprises that enjoy its benefits, including the corporation.

146
147
148

Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 361.
See discussion of other legal enterprises’ entity status infra Part V.A.
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Entity equality for sole proprietors would give them the benefits of
business legal entity status, that is, the ability to own property in the
business name, to sue and to be sued in the business name, to obtain
credit, and perhaps to limit business liability to the business itself.
While it is noted that a sole proprietor can currently achieve these
desirable goals by incorporating, creating a limited liability company,
or associating as a general partnership, these actions require additional expense that would not be necessary or appropriate if the following statutory changes were adopted. Appendix A is a chart of the
current entity features of a sole proprietorship compared to those
proposed in this Article. Appendix B to this Article is a proposed
uniform sole proprietorship statute that codifies the legal entity features of a proposed revised sole proprietorship law.
IV. UNCONSCIOUS AND INSTITUTIONAL CLASSISM AND THE CASE FOR
EXPANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THEORY TO TREAT SOLE
PROPRIETORS FAIRLY
This Part argues that the present state of constitutional rights theory fails to redress the unconscious and institutional classism that sole
proprietors face under the current state of the law and that constitutional rights theory needs expansion to find a constitutional basis for
treating the sole proprietorship the same as other business forms,
that is, as a legal entity for titling purposes.
A. Current Constitutional Considerations Fail to Redress Entity Inequality
A constitutional analysis of entity equality—the right of the sole
proprietorship to be granted legal entity status—demonstrates that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution does not compel the states to grant entity status to
the sole proprietorship. Arguing in favor of entity equality under
current constitutional considerations would be a difficult task.
1. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution provides that “No state shall . . . deny to any
149
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The
149

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (1989) (providing details on the rationale for and of
the Fourteenth Amendment); PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
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Equal Protection Clause can be seen as an attempt to secure the
promise of the United States’s professed commitment to the proposition that “all men are created equal” by empowering the judiciary to
150
enforce that principle against the states.
In the wake of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states could not, among other things, de151
prive people of the equal protection of the laws. The Equal Protection Clause has been applied most significantly to protect the civil
152
rights of African Americans.
In determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court has applied three levels of scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, a law is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. In addition, there
cannot be a less restrictive alternative available to achieve that com153
pelling interest.
Under intermediate scrutiny, a law is unconstitutional unless it is substantially related to an important government in154
terest. Finally, under rational basis, a law is constitutional so long as
155
it is reasonably related to a legitimate government interest.
2. Equal Protection and Commercial Regulations
Arguments for entity equality must overcome the Supreme
Court’s deference to state regulation of economic concerns. Regarding economic concerns, the Court is very deferential to state authority:

150
151
152

153

154
155

DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000) (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment in a historical context).
See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., supra note 149.
See id. (discussing the expanding application of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
civil rights through American history).
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the State’s maintenance
of segregated educational facilities denied African American children equal protection);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that Texas’s state system of law schools,
which educated blacks and whites at separate institutions, was unconstitutional); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the Democratic primary in Texas, in which
voting was restricted to whites alone, was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds);
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that a state’s offering of a
legal education to whites but not to blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding that the denial of the right to vote based on race
was unconstitutional); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (holding that the
exclusion of blacks from juries was a denial of equal protection to black defendants).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9 (3d ed. 2006); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; Korematsu v. United
States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 153, § 9.
Id.
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When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the
Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations.
Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn
upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded wide latitude in
the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and
rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathemati156
cal exactitude.

As a result, the Court has applied rational basis review to economic issues. The Supreme Court has articulated the governing
standard of review as follows:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
157
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

3. Equal Protection and the Sole Proprietorship
Working against entity equality is the legal perception that there
are inherent differences between a sole proprietorship and a corporation. The primary justification for treating the sole proprietorship
as identical to its owner and not as a separate legal entity is that
“[t]here are inherent differences between operating a business as a
sole proprietorship” and operating a business as a separate legal en158
tity like a corporation.
Where there are real differences between

156

157

158

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (citation omitted)
(upholding ordinance prohibiting certain businesses from operating in the city’s French
Quarter because it rationally furthered the city’s purpose of supporting the customs and
preserving the appearance of the area).
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (holding that classifications in laws
restricting the sale of certain goods on Sunday did not result in a denial of equal protection).
Cedar Valley FS, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., No. AA-1827, 1992 WL 510794, at
*5 (D. Iowa Jan. 27, 1992) (holding that the decision not to exempt a corporate merger
was not a violation of Cedar Valley’s equal protection right because the denial of exemption did not constitute an arbitrary classification).

248

[Vol. 11:2

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

classifications, there is no violation of equal protection.
fornia Court of Appeals has stated:

159

As the Cali-

[There is no] merit in the remaining contention that different statutory treatment of “sole proprietors or partners” on the one hand, and
corporations and corporate officers on the other, is “class legislation”
and a denial of “equal protection.” Treatment of corporations as a distinct class has received widespread constitutional sanction. . . . “The
equality guaranteed by the equal protection clause is equality under the
same conditions, and among persons similarly situated. The Legislature
may make a reasonable classification of persons and businesses and other
activities and pass special legislation applying to certain classes. The classification must not be arbitrary, but must be based upon some difference
in the classes having a substantial relation to a legitimate object to be ac160
complished.”

As of now, only heightened scrutiny would circumvent the Court’s
deferential treatment of state economic regulatory concerns under
rational basis review. To employ heightened scrutiny, the Court must
find either that the sole proprietorship constitutes a suspect classifica161
tion or that the differing treatment of the sole proprietorship in162
fringes upon an owner’s fundamental rights.
4. The Sole Proprietorship as a Suspect Classification
On the surface, sole proprietors are not entitled to entity equality
as a suspect class. Suspect classes typically have a “‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ or [have] been subjected to unique disabilities
on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
159

160

161

162

See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause “does not demand that a statute necessarily apply
equally to all persons or require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law
as though they were the same” (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966))); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
63 (2001) (stating that a statutory scheme that imposed different requirements for a
child’s citizenship depending upon whether the child’s citizen parent was his mother or
father was “neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective” because
“[f]athers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological
parenthood”).
Topps & Trowsers v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 102, 105 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) (quoting 3 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 131, at 1934–36)
(citing CAL. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–24;) (finding no merit in the claim that different statutory treatment of sole proprietors or partners and corporations or corporate officers
amounts to class legislation and a denial of equal protection).
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding
that mental retardation is not a suspect classification “calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded economic and social legislation”).
See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that conditioning the right to vote on the payment of a tax violated the Equal Protection Clause).
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163

abilities.” An alleged disadvantaged class of individuals who choose
to operate their businesses as sole proprietorships and not as single
member corporations or limited liability companies is not obviously a
“suspect” class.
But beneath the surface, sole proprietors are often composed of
members of suspect classes, groups who have been historically discriminated against and have exhibited “obvious, immutable, or dis164
tinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”
Take, for example, the case of African American sole proprietors. As
the Supreme Court considers “African Americans” to be a suspect
class, if they were to sue the state alleging they were discriminated
against because they are African Americans, then the class is obviously suspect. However, if instead they were to argue that state law
discriminates against them purely because they are sole proprietors,
then the class is obviously not suspect. An argument positing that the
state discriminates against them because they are both African
American and sole proprietors would trigger heightened scrutiny because they are African Americans.
165
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court established
criteria for determining suspect classifications while grappling with
the question of whether mental retardation should be a suspect class,
after a group home for the mentally retarded was denied a special
166
permit in Texas.
The Court considered four factors before concluding that the mentally retarded were not a suspect class:
(1) whether there is a history of “continuing antipathy and prejudice”
against the group; (2) whether the group is “politically powerless in
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of lawmakers”; (3) whether the group is defined by an “immutable” characteristic; and (4) whether that characteristic is one that is generally irrele167
vant.
Despite a finding that mental retardation satisfied the first and
168
third factors, the Cleburne Court denied suspect classification. This
163

164

165
166
167
168

Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) (holding that an age classification
in a statute requiring police officers to retire at age fifty was rationally related to the
state’s interest of ensuring its officers’ physical preparedness).
In re Watson, 332 B.R. 740, 746 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S.
635, 638 (1986)) (noting that individuals who choose to operate their businesses as sole
proprietorships have not been historically discriminated against).
473 U.S. 432.
See id. at 442–46.
Id.
Id. at 446–47.
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analysis suggests that each factor must be fulfilled to warrant heightened scrutiny, which is more probing than rational basis review.
Relative to business forms, the Supreme Court has held that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Equal Protection
169
Clause.
States have promulgated laws that define the various aspects of corporations and that give corporations their distinct identity
as a unique juridical entity. Accordingly, because the Equal Protection Clause provides that no state can deny any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws, it follows that the sole proprietorship and/or the sole proprietor should also be afforded the same
treatment, that is, equal protection. As a result, states should enact
laws defining the various aspects of the sole proprietorship as a distinct, unique juridical entity.
5. Equal Protection Challenges to Facially Neutral State Statutes
If a suspect class of sole proprietors were to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute that discriminated between the sole proprietorship, the partnership, and the corporation, they would face
additional challenges to trigger heightened scrutiny. Presumably, the
state statute would be facially neutral, meaning the statutory language
has no express mention of the suspect class. As such, to succeed, the
claim should allege that the facially neutral law has a disparate impact
among members of the suspect class and that discrimination against
170
this class was the intent and purpose of the state act.
Not all regulations are equal. A legislature can present legitimate
reasons for legislative acts that may disadvantage street vendors over
store front merchants or for why the length of a cargo train should be
less than twenty-four cars. But a legislature’s arbitrary denial by default of entity status to sole proprietorships indiscriminate of industry
can hardly be said to have a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest. In addition, another argument in favor of entity equality is
that the legislative failure to grant the sole proprietorship entity
status disadvantages small businesses, especially those composed of
underserved, suspect class communities far more frequently, and may

169

170

Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (declaring that there was no
need to hear argument on whether the Equal Protection Clause protected corporations,
because “[w]e are all of opinion that it does”).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (upholding a police department’s use
of a written personnel test even though it had a disproportionate impact on black applicants because such impact alone could not infer a discriminatory intent on the part of the
state).
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rise to support an argument for disparate impact, although it may be
difficult to prove discriminatory intent.
6. Entity Status as a Fundamental Right
Perhaps sole proprietors can successfully argue that entity status is
a fundamental constitutional right as a denegation of the owner’s
right to the pursuit of happiness. A fundamental right, as defined by
the U.S. Supreme Court, is “akin to free speech or marriage or to
those other rights . . . that the Court has come to regard as fundamental and that demand the lofty requirement of a compelling gov171
ernmental interest before they may be significantly regulated.”
While it is difficult to imagine how entity status might rise to a fundamental right, as the following analysis demonstrates, failing to provide the sole proprietorship entity status by default and under operation of the rules and principles of the common law is inherently
unfair and discriminatory in comparison to the law’s treatment of
other one-person entities, namely, the one-person corporation and
the one-person limited liability company. Granting the sole proprietorship entity status ensures equal treatment with the one-person corporation and the one-person limited liability company. This is because the threats to the sole proprietorship are virtually identical to
those facing entity businesses like the corporation. Treating business
types differently is inherently unfair, raising fundamental rights to
the pursuit of happiness and equal protection issues.
An additional constitutionally-based argument in favor of granting
the sole proprietorship entity status might be made under the Dormant Commerce Clause. If it could be established that the lack of
“entity protection” for sole proprietors unduly burdens interstate
commerce, then differing treatment of different types of businesses
would be unconstitutional.
For the above reasons, an equal protection claim on behalf of sole
proprietors would likely fail current judicial scrutiny.
7. Final Word on Current Constitutional Considerations
While courts are generally deferential to economic regulations
under rational basis review, state laws motivated by irrational beliefs,
antiquated values, or stereotypic notions of class attributes may still

171

United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973), cited in In re Watson, 332 B.R. 740, 746
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005).
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be suspect under rational basis review. The lynchpin of the argument
favoring entity equality is that the current state of the law reflects antiquated notions of the sole proprietorship. Nowadays, the sole proprietorship and indeed all one-person businesses are more sophisticated than ever before. Evidence of this fact is the proliferation of
one-person corporations and one-person limited liability companies,
and the law’s universal acceptance of their existence as legal entities.
V. PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR ENTITY EQUALITY
Although the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
does not compel the states to grant entity status to sole proprietorships for titling purposes, public policy provides convincing arguments why the states should choose to do so. One argument is that
the law has provided many public policy reasons for treating other
business enterprises as a legal entity and that many of these apply to
the sole proprietorship. For example, and by way of comparison, § 4
of the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act gives an
unincorporated nonprofit association the power to acquire an estate
in real property, and thus an unincorporated or nonprofit association
organized in a state that has adopted that act will be an unincorpo172
rated “legal entity.” The following argues on behalf of states’ adoption of the entity theory of sole proprietorship for titling purposes.
A. All Other Business Enterprises Are Granted Legal Entity Status for Titling
Purposes
1. The Corporation as a Legal Entity
Early in the development of corporate law, a corporation was con173
sidered an artificial person or legal entity.
“[A] corporation may
also be viewed as a fund of property, a band of investors, a crew of
174
workers, or merely as an entry in official records.”
This relatively

172
173

174

UNIF. NONPROFIT UNINCORPORATED ASSOC. ACT § 4 (1996).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 186–87. By 1765, it was understood that a corporation has the
power to “sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by its corporate
name, and do all other acts as natural persons may.” Id. at 186 (quoting WILLIAM
BLACKTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *475). To be sure, “Chief Justice Marshall, paraphrased
Blackstone in a famous comment in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, [17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
250, 304 (1819)], when he defined a corporation as an ‘artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’” Id. at 187 (footnote omitted).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 192 (citing A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 416
(1976)).
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mundane legal characteristic, the doctrinal fiction of an artificial en175
tity, is extraordinarily important in many ways.
A reflection on the implications of corporation law suggests that
176
In
entity status provides a benefit to businesses and their owners.
fact, entity status provides many benefits to a corporation, its officers,
and its owners. For example, entity status allows a corporation to
177
“vastly reduce[] the costs of contracting for credit.” A corporation
can use its separate assets “to enter into contracts, such as bank
178
loans.” Entity status also allows a corporation to have an indefinite
“life,” and supports tradable shares, centralized management, and
179
limited liability.
2. The General Partnership as a Legal Entity
Similar to the corporation, the general partnership enjoys the
benefits of entity status. The general partnership has been treated as
a legal entity for many purposes, but it was not always thought to be
180
so.
The historical development of the general partnership from a
legal aggregate to a legal entity is instructive relative to the developmental needs of the sole proprietorship.
Historically, the common law treated general partnerships as an
181
aggregation of individuals.
In drafting the UPA in 1914, the
NCCUSL did not totally reject the common law view of partnerships,
often treating them as legal entities separate from their owners for
most purposes and as legal aggregates of their owners for other pur182
poses.
Yet, the UPA adopted the view that a general partnership
should be legally recognized as a legal entity in several circumstances.

175
176

177
178
179
180
181
182

See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83–84.
See id. at 83 (providing some of the practical advantages of a corporation’s entity status).
See generally CLARK, supra note 17, at 17–19 (describing the entity status of a corporation);
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 62–63 (same).
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83 (citing Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000)).
Id.; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 177, at 401–02 n.22 (discussing the costeffective strategy of participating by subincorporation).
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 78, at 83–84.
See CLARK, supra note 17, at 15–16 n.39 (discussing partnership treatment prior to 1907);
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 62–63 (discussing early case law on partnerships).
See CLARK, supra note 17, at 15–16 n.39.
Id.; see,e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (stating that partners are jointly and severally
liable for the debts of a partnership); Id. § 29 (stating that a partnership lacks continuity
of existence); cf. I.R.C. § 701 (2000) (stating that individual partners are liable for the income tax of a partnership “in their separate or individual capacities”).
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Today, there are many circumstances under which a general partnership is clearly a legal entity. For example, a partnership may acquire title to real estate in the partnership name which, if so ac183
quired, can be convened only in the partnership name.
In
184
addition, each partner is an agent of the partnership. Any partner
may also convey title to real property that is in the partnership name,
but the partnership may not recover such property unless the partner
185
binds the partnership.
Additionally, a partnership’s assets, liabilities, and business transactions are treated as those of the business
unit and are considered distinct from the partners’ individual assets,
186
liabilities, and non-partnership business transactions.
In marshaling assets, the partnership’s assets and liabilities are considered separate and distinct from those of the respective individual partners, and
partnership creditors have a prior right to partnership assets, while
individual partners’ creditors have a prior right, respectively, to the
187
And there are other
separate assets of their individual debtors.
provisions in the UPA that recognize the existence of a partnership as
188
a separate legal entity.
183
184

185

186

187

188

UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 8(3) (1914) (“Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name.”).
Id. § 9(1) (“Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business,
and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of
which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no
authority to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom
he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.”).
Id. § 10(1) (“Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any partner may
convey title to such property by a conveyance executed in the partnership name; but the
partnership may recover such property unless the partner’s act binds the partnership under the provisions of paragraph (1) of section 9, or unless such property has been conveyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such grantee to a holder for value
without knowledge that the partner, in making the conveyance, has exceeded his authority.”).
See id. § 25(1) (“A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property
holding as a tenant in partnership.”); id. § 25(2)(b) (“A partner’s right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of the rights
of all the partners in the same property.”); id. § 25(2)(c) (“A partner’s right in specific
partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against
the partnership. When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt the partners, or any of them, or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right
under the homestead or exemption laws.”).
REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 40(h) (“When partnership property and the individual properties
of the partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership creditors
shall have priority on partnership property and separate creditors on individual property,
saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as heretofore.”).
See, e.g., id. § 11 (stating that a partnership is bound by an admission or representation
made by a partner); id. § 12 (stating that a partnership is charged with knowledge of or
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In 1994, the NCCUSL cemented the general partnership’s entity
status in RUPA, which states that a partnership is “an entity distinct
189
from its partners.” In addition to RUPA, other statutes treat a general partnership as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its individual owners. For example, in certain state and federal courts, a
190
partnership may sue and be sued in the partnership’s name. In ad191
dition, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Reform
192
Act both define a partnership as a person. The State of Louisiana,
following its civil law tradition, regards a partnership as a full legal
193
entity. Therefore, a general partnership is sometimes a legal entity
194
and sometimes a legal aggregate. By comparison to a general partnership, although quite different in many ways, a limited partnership
195
is similarly a legal entity.
3. The Limited Liability Company as Legal Entity
Another business form, the limited liability company (“LLC”), is
196
by statutory definition a legal entity. Like a corporation and a partnership, an LLC is a legal entity, separate from its owners or mem197
bers.
Despite getting off to a slow start, in 1996, as a result of the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) issuing final regulations simplifying

189
190

191
192
193
194
195
196

197

notice to a partner of any matter concerning the partnership); id. § 13 (stating that a
partnership is bound by any wrongful act or omission of a partner); id. § 14 (stating that a
partnership is bound to make good the loss on account of a breach of partnership trust
by a partner); id. § 19 (stating that partners must have access to partnership books, which
are required to be kept at the partnership’s principal place of business); id. § 26 (stating
that a partner’s interest in a partnership is his share of the partnership’s profits).
REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201(a) (1994) (amended 1997).
See, e.g., Connecticut Licensing Info Center, Glossary of Business Structures, http://www.
ct-clic.com/Content/Glossary_of_ Business_Terms.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (indicating that Connecticut is an example of a state that permits such action).
U.C.C. § 1-201(27) (2005).
11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2000).
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2806–43 (2005) (enumerating provisions that govern general
partnerships in the state).
See supra notes 182–93 and accompanying text.
See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 104 (2001) (“A limited partnership is a legal entity distinct
from its partners.”).
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (1996) (“A limited liability company is a legal entity distinct from its members.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-201(b) (2005) (“A limited liability
company formed under this chapter shall be a separate legal entity . . . .”). See generally 2
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES § 19:8 (Supp. 2008) (discussing circumstances where a single-member LLC
has an impact).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 126 (comparing LLCs to corporations and general partnerships).
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tax laws, allowing taxpayers to treat unincorporated business organizations on an elective “check the box” basis, LLCs achieved their
198
greatest popularity. In addition to providing flexible tax treatment,
LLC law was revolutionary as it was the first to grant an unincorporated entity statutory limited liability.
As seen with corporations, partnerships, and LLCs, entity status
has its advantages. Clearly, sole proprietorship law begs for greater
development and modernization along the lines of other business
forms.
B. Entity Equality Demands That the Sole Proprietorship Be Granted Entity
Status
In addition to fair treatment as a legal entity, sole proprietorship
law’s proposed entity status would reflect its functional separateness
199
from its owner, financially, psychologically, and sociologically. For
example, sole proprietorships often adopt a fictitious business name,
must comply with general business and licensing requirements, and
often establish a separate tax identification number. A review of
these aspects of the sole proprietorship shows its separation from its
owner.
1. Operating Under an Assumed Name
One example of how the sole proprietorship functions separately
from its owner is the adoption of a trade, assumed, or fictitious
200
name. So that the public is not deceived, state laws require that an
assumed or fictitious name be filed in the appropriate public record;
some prescribe criminal penalties for using an unregistered fictitious
201
name. There are few legal restrictions on the use of specific words
198
199
200

201

See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,585 (Dec. 18,
1996) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 301, 602).
EISENBERG, supra note 2, at 1.
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 41 (discussing examples of the use of assumed names by
proprietorships); Gordon E. McClintock, Fictitious Business Name Legislation—Modernizing
California’s Pioneer Statute, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1349, 1349 (1968) (noting that “[t]he common law permitted a sole proprietor or partnership to adopt and use an assumed business or trade name in transacting business”); cf. Cal. Law Revision Comm’n, Recommendation and Study Relating to Fictitious Business Names, 9 REPS., RECOMMENDATIONS, & STUDS.
601, 608 (1969) (concluding that while California should keep its fictitious name statute,
many revisions are recommended).
See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY & CRAIG E. DAUCHY, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S GUIDE TO BUSINESS
LAW 50 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that sole proprietorships require “no government filing except a fictitious-business-name statement, which discloses the name under which the
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in trade names; in most states, for example, terms such as “corporation,” “incorporated,” or “Inc.” may not be used because they falsely
202
imply that the business is incorporated.
2. The Sole Proprietorship Must Comply with Business Permitting,
Licensing, and Operating Requirements
The second area of analysis regarding how the sole proprietorship
functions in conjunction with its owner is its compliance with busi203
ness permitting, licensing, and operating requirements.
Since the
sole proprietorship is essentially a private business enterprise, it is required to obtain a business license and to collect sales taxes where
204
appropriate. Like every other business type, the sole proprietorship
must comply with all general licensing and operating statutes. For
example, “[a] proprietorship that conducts a pharmacy or a gun
shop must comply with the various legal requirements applicable to
205
such businesses.”
“If the proprietorship is engaged in a professional practice such as law, medicine, dentistry, or accounting, both
the proprietor and each person having responsibility for providing
206
professional services must be licensed.”
Unlike a corporation, a
“[sole] proprietorship may open a new office or facility in another
state, without obtaining permission or qualifying to transact business . . . [but a] corporation . . . may be required to obtain permis207
sion to transact business in the second state.” Opening an office in
another state may subject the proprietor to suits in that state, may require the proprietor to file an assumed name certificate in the new
state, and may hold the proprietor liable for state income taxes in the

202

203

204
205
206
207

business will be conducted and the owner’s name and address”); CONARD ET AL., supra
note 5, at 17.
See CONARD ET AL., supra note 5, at 17. See generally Checklist: Starting a Sole Proprietorship, http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-structures/sole-proprietorship/sole-pro
prietorship-checklist.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (demonstrating how unrestrictive
the name-choosing process is in general).
See generally AM. BAR ASSOC., FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE ch. 12 (3d ed. 2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family_legal_guide/chapter_12.pdf
(discussing various issues related to small businesses using a user-friendly question-andanswer format); STATE OF IND., BUSINESS OWNER’S GUIDE TO STATE GOVERNMENT (2008),
available at http://www.in.gov/core/files/Businesss_Owners_Guide608.pdf (providing an
overview under Indiana law).
See BUSINESS OWNER’S GUIDE, supra note 203, at 3, 5, 7.
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45.
Id.
Id.; see also Sole Proprietor Magazine, What is Sole Proprietorship?, http://www.solepro
prietormagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=231 (noting that
“[y]our sole proprietorship exists as soon as you start doing business”).
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208

new state. In these ways, the sole proprietorship faces the same or
similar licensing isses as do other business types.
3. Taxation of the Sole Proprietorship: Individual or Business?
The third instance of how the sole proprietorship functions separate from its owner is its use of a separate tax identification number,
as well as business tax strategies not available to individual tax filers.
The sole proprietorship, not unlike other types of businesses, is permitted to apply for and receive a tax identification number different
from that of its owner’s social security number, such as a separate tax
209
or employee identification number (“TIN” or “EIN”).
The manner of reporting the income and expenses of a proprietorship is
interesting because it reflects a pragmatic compromise between the legal
view that a proprietorship is not a separate entity from its owner and the
economic view that that the proprietorship’s financial affairs should not
210
be intermixed with the proprietor’s personal affairs.

In addition to often using a separate tax identification number, the
sole proprietorship often uses business tax strategies. While the sole
211
proprietorship is not a separate taxable entity and is required to file
212
the long-form 1040, personal tax return, the Internal Revenue
Code also requires a separate tax form, Schedule C, to be prepared to
213
record the gain or loss from each business owned by the taxpayer.
The business income or loss is reported on the proprietor’s personal
income tax return, the form 1040, while a considerably simpler form,
the Schedule C-EZ is available for the very smallest business that has
214
no employees and less than $25,000 in gross receipts.
“[T]he Internal Revenue Code requires the entrepreneur to file quarterly declarations of estimated tax, and to make the payment of estimated tax
215
each quarter reflected on that declaration.

208
209

210
211
212
213
214
215

HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45.
Id. at 48; see also I.R.S. Form SS-4, Application for Employer Identification Number (OMB
No. 1545-0003) (2007). See generally I.R.S., TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESS, PUBLICATION
334 (2007), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p334.pdf (last visited Sep. 4, 2006) (providing general information about federal tax laws applicable to small business owners).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47.
See Sole Proprietorship Magazine, supra note 207.
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47.
See BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 201, at 50.
See HENRY B.R. BEALE, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., HOME-BASED BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION (2004), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs235tot.pdf.
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 47. See generally Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87 (1959)
(assessing additional tax for the failure to file a declaration of estimated income tax without reasonable cause).
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Therefore, for the various ways in which a sole proprietor operates
her business separate from her personal life, fundamental and distributive justice as well as socioeconomic theory demand that the parameters of constitutional theory be expanded to remedy the law’s
failure to treat the sole proprietorship as a legal entity for titling purposes.
VI. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ENTITY STATUS PROVISIONS OF THE
USPA
Part VI presents the opposition to treating the sole proprietorship
as a legal entity. What follows is a discussion of three arguments
against the entity status provisions of the Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act (“USPA”) and a response to each. While the first one directly challenges entity status for the sole proprietorship, the other
two challenge corollary features that may follow entity status, specifically, limited liability and perpetual existence. In the end, none of
these arguments outweighs the benefits of entity equality for sole
proprietors.
A. The USPA Is Flawed Because One Person Cannot Legally Clone Herself
into Another Legal Entity
One argument against the USPA is that it contradicts a common
viewpoint that the sole proprietorship automatically fails to qualify as
216
a separate entity because it is owned by one person.
This solitary
alter ego view of the sole proprietorship is discussed earlier in this Ar217
ticle. On the surface, it seems logical that the law should not allow
a person to legally clone herself into another, separate legal entity.
But, in point of fact, the law currently allows legal cloning through
the use of other legal business entities, other than the sole proprietorship. That is, one person can legally create and own a one-person
corporation; and, in many if not all jurisdictions, a one-person limited liability company or several such one-person entities.

216

217

See GREGORY & HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 2, at 833
(“Strictly speaking, the sole proprietorship is not a business organization since, by definition, it has only one owner and indeed the owner and the business entity are one and the
same.”); HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 2, at 251 (“For legal purposes, a proprietorship
is not a separate entity.”); Credit Assocs. of Maui, Ltd. v. Carlbom, 50 P.3d 431, 432 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2002) (holding a sole proprietor personally liable for the debts of his proprietorship because “a sole proprietorship has no legal identity apart from its owner”).
See supra Part II.A.
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The laws of the one-person corporation and of the one-person
limited liability company refute the argument that the sole proprietorship cannot be an entity because it is owned by one person. But
from a current constitutional perspective, as the sole proprietorship
is distinctly different from the corporation and the LLC, it is not entitled to equal protection treatment, as was fully explored earlier in this
218
Article.
The following discussion of the sole proprietorship assumes that it
must be owned by one individual, living person. There is no statutory
test or legal requirement that a sole proprietorship must be owned by
a living person. As a result, as a corporation has been deemed to be a
legal person, it is legally possible for a corporation to own a sole proprietorship. Also, as the UPA considers a partnership a legal entity
for several purposes, it would appear that a general partnership could
own a sole proprietorship. And, arguably, there could be a one219
person limited liability partnership.
This discussion of the varying
potentional owners of a sole proprietorship shows that legal analysis
of sole proprietorship law is never as simple as it first appears.
1. The One-Person Corporation or an Incorporated Proprietorship
Historically, the corporation was not designed as an alternative to
220
the sole proprietorship. But over the years, state statutes have provided for and courts have sanctioned corporations owned by a single
shareholder, the “incorporated proprietorship” or “one-person cor221
poration.”
Today, all states allow for the creation of an incorpo218
219
220

221

See supra Part IV.
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 176.
See generally WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (2005) (discussing the development and history of the corporation).
COX & HAZEN, supra note 2, at 24 (citing Leventhal v. Atl. Fin. Corp., 55 N.E.2d 20 (Mass.
1944); Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 144 N.E. 519 (N.Y. 1924)); see, e.g., Factors & Traders’ Ins.
Co. v. New Harbor Prot. Co., 37 La. Ann. 233 (1885) (holding that a corporation was not
a “person” within the Louisiana statute authorizing the formation of a corporation by any
number of “persons” not less than six); Keller v. Haas, 12 So.2d 238 (La. 1943) (holding
that an individual shareholder could not use a corporation to shield himself from personal liability); L.L. Ridgeway Co. v. Marks, 146 So.2d 61, 63 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (holding
that even if the shares of a corporation pass into the hands of one person, the theory of
the corporate entity and limited liability is preserved); Lindstrom v. Sauer, 166 So. 636,
638 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (holding also that a shareholder cannot use a corporation as a
shiled against personal liability). For general discussions of the one-person corporation,
see ROBERT A. ESPERTI & RENNO L. PETERSON, INCORPORATING YOUR TALENTS: A GUIDE
TO THE ONE-PERSON CORPORATION OR HOW TO LEAD A SHELTERED LIFE 5–6 (1984);
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 213–18; Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man
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rated proprietorship wherein one person owns all the shares of the
222
corporation and operates the business with total autonomy.
The
incorporated proprietorship’s assets are legally owned by the corporation; the shares have value only to the extent the corporation’s
business and assets have value; shares are not the same as the corpo223
rate assets. But a sole entrepreneur may be best advised to incorporate her enterprise and elect “S-corporation” tax treatment to avoid
potentially costly reclassification as a corporation and double taxa224
tion.
2. The One-Person Limited Liability Company (“LLC”)
Similar to the one-person corporation, in virtually every state to225
day, one person may form a limited liability company.
Generally,
226
LLCs have seven chief legal characteristics. A one-person LLC may
227
be member-managed or manager-managed. In a member-managed
LLC, each member has the right to participate in management decision-making and to sign contracts on behalf of the LLC, whereas in a

222

223
224
225

226

227

Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473 (1953); Warner
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373
(1938); R. Barry McComic, Theory of the Corporate Entity and the One-Man Corporation in Louisiana, 38 TUL. L. REV. 738 (1964); Mario Rotondi, Limited Liability of the Individual Trader:
One-Man Company or Commercial Foundation?, 48 TUL. L. REV. 989 (1974).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 214 & n.62 (noting that some states require that there be
more than one director and more than one officer); id. at 252 (describing some of the
modifications of the standard corporate form for closely held corporations, such as a reducing the size of the board of directors and allowing one person to perform all corporate functions). See generally Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 336–39 (describing various statutory strategies to address the unique problems of closely held corporations).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 214–15.
See id. at 143.
See Findlaw, Limited Liability Company FAQ—Small Business, http://smallbusiness.find
law.com/business-structures/llc/llc-faq.html (“You can form an LLC in any state with just
one owner.”); see, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301(A)(10) (2005) (defining the limited
liability company as “an entity that is an unincorporated association having one or more
members that is organized and existing under this Chapter”). See generally HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 143 (noting that several states specifically authorize the creation of a oneperson LLC).
John M. Cunningham, What Are the Main Legal Characteristics of LLCs? How Do the Characteristics of LLCs Compare with Those of Non-LLC Entities? (2005), http://www.llcformations
.com/3.1%20LLC%20legal%20characteristics%20-%204-14-04.htm. These characteristics
include: (1) entity status; (2) a one-member minimum; (3) contractual freedom and enforceability; (4) statutory informality; (5) statutory liability shielding; (6) statutory asset
protection; and (7) two alternate management structures—member-management or
manager-management. Id.
Id.
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manager-managed LLC a select group manages the business. The
LLC is an alternative for the sole proprietor seeking to shield her
personal assets from her business liabilities without the legal complexity of operating as a corporation.
* * *
Overall, critics of the entity status provisions of the USPA fail to
account for the fact that the law currently allows one-owner entities to
clone themselves as legal entities under both corporation law and
limited liability company law. Clearly, there are benefits to granting
the sole proprietorship entity status, as reflected by benefits and efficiencies that one-person corporations and one-person limited liability
companies enjoy. The entity status benefits of the USPA include the
ability to take title to property, to establish credit, to enter into leases,
and to open bank accounts, all in the name of the business entity.
B. The USPA Impliedly Grants Sole Proprietorships Limited Liability Along
with Entity Status
A second argument against the USPA is that it impliedly grants
limited liability to the sole proprietorship, contrary to recent argu229
ments favoring the complete abolition of total limited liability.
As
the sole proprietor owns all the property used by the business, she is
230
and should be personally responsible for all of the business’s debts.
The author believes that the sole proprietorship should be granted
limited liability, in addition to titling benefits, to achieve full equality
with other business types. The codification of sole proprietorship
228

229

230

See generally James R. Walker, Limited Liability Companies: Structuring Members’ Economic
Rights, 34 COLO. LAW. 73 (2005) (discussing structuring an LLC in order to maximize the
economic rights of its members).
See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 37–41
(1999) (citing as an example, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991) (promoting pro-rated
shares of corporate tort liabilities)); Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992) (arguing that procedural obstacles will make it unlikely that changes in state law will affect a corporation’s excess tort
liability); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992) (arguing that efforts to regulate through market manipulation will generally fail to meet desired objectives); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991) (promoting an aggregate
approach to piercing the corporate veil).
HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 39; see also BAGLEY & DAUCHY, supra note 201, at 50 (explaining that the sole proprietorship is often considered a poor business choice because the
owner has unlimited liability, which puts all her personal assets at risk).
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law, such as the USPA, is an essential first step toward a limited liabil231
ity sole proprietorship statute (“LLSP”). But granting the sole proprietorship entity status for titling purposes alone does not imply or
require granting it limited liability.
Limited liability and entity status are not joined at the hip like
Siamese twins. Entity status and limited liability are not one and the
same. A business enterprise might have legal entity status separate
from its owners, while the owners continue to have personal liability
232
for the business’s liabilities. In addition, the law fails to provide the
owners of limited liability entities an absolute shield against business
233
liabilities. For example, courts have developed “piercing the corporate veil” law to impose personal liability on shareholders for business
234
liabilities, with most piercing cases involving three or fewer share235
On the other hand, sole proprietors, like the owners of
holders.
other business forms, are responsible for their agents’ actions under
236
the principles of agency law.
Sole proprietors may achieve some limited liability protections
without statutory entity status. For example, they can avoid personal
exposure for business liabilities, such as a loan from a creditor, if the
237
lender agrees to a “nonrecourse” loan. In addition, they may be entitled to some statutory protections including homestead, anti238
As previseizure, and prohibition against garnishment for wages.
ously discussed, infra Part III.B.1.e, under recent case law, a sole proprietor was not entitled to statutory immunity for negligent supervision liability extended to corporations, partnerships, and persons not

231
232
233

234

235
236
237

238

See Crusto, supra note 5, at 397–417 (providing provisions of a proposed Model LLSP
Act).
See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103–105 (1997) (describing the nature of liability for a partner and a partnership in relation to a partner’s wrongful act).
See Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (suggesting that the liability protection afforded to LLCs “will
not be markedly different than the protection provided by the corporate form”).
O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 541–44 (“The separateness of the corporate entity is normally to be respected. However, a corporation’s veil will be pierced whenever
corporate form is employed to evade an existing obligation, circumvent a statute, perpetuate fraud, commit a crime, or work an injustice.”).
Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1036, 1036 (1991) (analyzing an empirical study of reported appellate piercing cases).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).
See RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 2, at 60 (noting that “[c]ourts have generally enforced
the liability limiting provisions of nonrecourse contracts, at least where the party alleged
to be bound knew of the limitations and consented to them”).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 42–43 & n.9 (stating that if a proprietor files for bankruptcy, individual and business assets and liabilities are covered).
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in privity of contract with the plaintiff, and therefore could be held
239
liable for the employee’s misconduct. A strong dissent recognized
the anomaly of extending limited liability to firms for the acts of sub240
ordinates but not to the sole proprietorship.
To refute the limited liability critique of the USPA, one needs
241
only to analyze RUPA’s treatment of general partnerships.
There
the law grants a general partnership entity status while expressly
242
maintaining personal joint and several liabilities to its partners.
Therefore, it is possible to follow the statutory lead of RUPA by providing the sole proprietorship entity status for titling purposes while
maintaining personal, flow-though exposure for business liability. By
doing so, the USPA would avoid creating a whole new universe of veil243
piercing problems, but this is beyond the purview of this Article.
C. The USPA Wrongly Creates Perpetual Life for Sole Proprietorships
A third argument against the USPA is that the USPA contradicts
the practical reality that when the sole proprietor dies (or disassociates through retirement, sale, or gift) her business often ends as well.
This critique has some practical merit, but this is an advantage of the
USPA, not a defect. Promoting longevity and flexibility of transfer in
ownership would likely be beneficial to the sole proprietor and would
be consistent with entity equality. The continuation of the business
under different ownership would be very desirable in the case of a
family-operated business or where employees may want to buy out the
244
owner, such as under a profit-sharing plan. Therefore, in order to
refute this argument against the USPA, one need only look to con239
240
241
242
243

244

Madden v. Aldrich, 58 S.W.3d 342 (Ark. 2001).
Id. at 360 (Imber, J., dissenting).
See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 103–105 (1997).
Id.
See PINTO & BRANSON, supra note 229, at 41–68 (describing procedures and contexts for
piercing the corporate veil); John H. Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing
the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for
Waiving Owners’ Limited-Liability Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 177 (2000) (noting that
“[d]epriving small business owners of their limited-liability protection because of their
indebtedness runs counter to the purpose” of the statute); Stephen B. Presser, The Bogalusa Explosion, “Single Business Enterprise,” “Alter Ego,” and Other Errors: Academics, Economics,
Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability: Back Towards a Unitary “Abuse” Theory of Piercing
the Corporate Veil, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 405, 420–27 (2006) (analyzing whether the use of
“single business enterprise” is suitable in determining liability); Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the
Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1994) (listing criteria
courts use to justify piercing the corporate veil).
See HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 45–46 (stating that structuring ownership to give employees ownership opportunities creates incentives to make a business more successful).
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tinuation features of all other business enterprises, including the
corporation, the general partnership, and the limited liability company. Allowing the sole proprietor’s business to continue after her
death might lead to creative ways to address the estate tax problem
245
that many small business owners and their families face, but an in
depth analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
As with other business types, particularly the general partnership,
the death of the owner should not automatically result in the termination of the business as well. Consider RUPA’s approach to the issue of “dissociation,” allowing the business the option to continue un246
interrupted following the death of a partner.
The general
partnership faces a unique dissociation problem with the death of
one partner of a two-person partnership: the general partnership
would devolve into a sole proprietorship by default, because by definition a partnership must be owned by two or more persons. While
the issue of dissociation has recently been evaluated in LLC stat247
utes, it is an interesting issue, the deeper analysis of which is beyond
the scope of this Article.
Analyzing the continuation issue of the sole proprietorship, an assessment of corporation law might also add some valuable insights.
Clearly, when it comes to a one-person corporation, the law has no
248
problem with perpetual existence. If the law does not prohibit such
perpetual existence for an incorporated proprietorship, there is no
reason why the law should disallow it for the sole proprietorship.

245

246

247
248

See John L. Ward, Growing the Family Business: Special Challenges and Best Practices, 10 FAM.
BUS. REV. 323, 330–34 (1997) (proposing practices to promote performance in light of
specific challenges to the sole proprietorship). See generally Douglas G. Baird & Edward R.
Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2310
(2005) (taking a critical look at creditors’ rights relative to small business bankruptcies).
See REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 601–705 (1997) (describing the processes of dissociation and
continuation, noting “a partner is dissociated from a partnership upon the occurrence of
certain events. . . . (7) in the case of a partner who is an individual: (i) the partner’s
death” (§ 601) and that dissociation does not mean the automatic dissolution and liquidation of the partnership, it may continue to operate pursuant to Article 7).
See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 601–704 (1996) (describing rights and the process of
dissociation).
See Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 778, 778 (1952) (stating that “under most statutes corporate existence
is permitted to be perpetual”); Lawrence A. Schei, Comment, Corporations: Statutory Revival of Corporate Existence, 28 CAL. L. REV. 195, 195–202 (1940) (discussing California statutes allowing corporations to extend terms of existence by altering the articles of incorporation).
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VII. ENTITY EQUALITY TO REMEDY UNCONSCIOUS CLASSISM AGAINST
SOLE PROPRIETORS
The solitary alter ego view of the sole proprietorship handicaps
sole proprietors and unconsciously relegates them to a legally disadvantaged status compared to their business association counterparts.
A modern, remedial approach would recognize that a sole proprietor
faces the same legal issues as owners of entity-granting business
forms, especially when it comes to titling matters. Therefore, appropriate legal reform would statutorily grant the sole proprietorship legal entity status for titling purposes. As constitutional law principles
have not yet been applied to redress this form of unconscious classism, constitutional theory should be expanded to support entity
equality between sole proprietors and other business owners. To do
so would promote principles of inherent fairness and would ensure
the continued growth of and financial contributions made by small
businesses, leading to the development of new applications of common law contract and tort law principles to sole proprietorship law.
In summary, entity equality for the sole proprietor ensures the same
mechanical efficiency that statutory authority currently provides
other business owners, placing sole proprietors on a level playing
field with partners, shareholders, and members.
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APPENDIX A: ENTITY FEATURES OF A SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP,
CURRENTLY COMPARED TO PROPOSED CHANGES
FEATURES
Agency

CURRENTLY
The sole proprietor is the sole
agent of the business.
No statutory authority.

Creation

Credit Reporting

Criminal Law

Duration

Sole proprietor’s credit is directly affected by the business
credit.
Criminal actions on behalf of
the business are imputed to
the sole proprietor.
Dissolved at death, bankruptcy, or termination.

Solitary alter ego, same as
owner; treat business as identical to the sole proprietor.
Entity

Goodwill

Liability

Licensing
Segregation

Management

Sole proprietor does not likely
benefit from business goodwill.
Sole proprietor is directly subject to unlimited liability for
the contracts, debts, and torts
of the business.
Sole proprietor’s personal licensing and business licensing
may not be separated.

The sole proprietor has complete management authority
and control.

PROPOSED CHANGES
The sole proprietor may assign
authority to others to act as the
sole proprietor’s agent for the
business.
No statutory compliance
needed; statutory authority to
define new normative features.
Credit issued solely in the
name of the business does not
appear on the credit report of
the sole proprietor.
Criminal actions on the
business’s behalf may be imputed to the business and not
to its owner in some cases.
May be perpetual; transferable
to surviving spouse (marital
ex-emption from estate tax);
may be put in trust.
Legal entity for some purposes
but not for all purposes,
making it subject to benefits
reserved to businesses, such as
business rates for rental cars,
insurance, credit cards, and
airlines.
As a separate entity with its own
separate client base and
accounting, business is more
likely to establish goodwill.
Sole proprietor still subject to
unlimited liability for the
contracts, debts, and torts of
the business, but only after
exhausting the business assets.
The sole proprietor’s personal
licensing status, such as practicing law, may be separate
from the business’s activities,
such as public adjusting.
The sole proprietor may appoint
management authority to another person, subject to final
authority and control exercised
by the sole proprietor.
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FEATURES

Name

Privacy

Suits

Taxation

Title of Property

Transferability

Trust
Treatment/
Estate Planning

CURRENTLY
Sole proprietor may adopt a
fictitious or assumed name,
subject to registration
requirements.
Sole proprietor’s business
activities are of record and go
to the personal reputation of
the sole proprietor.

In an action brought by or
against the sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor is the
sole and necessary party.
Sole proprietor may obtain
separate TIN/EIN and may
offset business expenses
beyond itemized deductions.
All business property must be
titled in the name of the sole
proprietor.
Interest of the sole proprietor
may not be assigned.

Sole proprietorship cannot be
the subject of a trust.

[Vol. 11:2

PROPOSED CHANGES
A sole proprietor may adopt a
separate business fictitious or
assumed name, which may be
registered and may include the
term “sole proprietorship” or
“s.p.” designation.
Sole proprietor’s business
activities may not be reflected
in the personal name of the
sole proprietor. Separate entity
may protect sole proprietor
from identity fraud.
The sole proprietorship may
sue or be sued in its own name.
Sole proprietor should obtain
separate TIN/EIN and should
file Schedule C to offset
business expenses.
All business property must be
titled under business name,
promoting ease of
transferability.
Interest of the sole proprietor
may be assigned; but the
assignee does not become the
sole proprietor.
Sole proprietorship can be
placed into a trust, providing
potential creditor protection,
estate planning benefits.

APPENDIX B: UNIFORM SOLE PROPRIETORSHIP ACT (“USPA”)
The following proposes the legal entity status features of a model
sole proprietorship statute, the Uniform Sole Proprietorship Act
(“USPA”). It follows the example of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ (“NCCUSL”) treatment of
the general partnership as a legal entity, rather than as an aggregate
of partners. The USPA is based, in part on the Uniform Partnership
249
250
Act (1914) and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994).

249
250

UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1914).
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997).
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§ 1. Sole Proprietorship Defined
(1) A sole proprietorship is an unincorporated or non-LLC business entity owned by one person, the sole proprietor or owner, for
the purpose of making a profit.
(2) A sole proprietorship is distinguished from other one-person
legal entities, including a one-owner corporation or a one-owner limited liability company.
§ 2. Rules for Determining the Existence of a Sole Proprietorship
In determining whether a sole proprietorship exists, these rules
shall apply:
(1) A person solely operating a business for profit may be legally
found to be a sole proprietorship, pursuant to the terms of this statute.
(2) A person solely owning a business for profit, in association
with family members may still be found to be a sole proprietorship.
(3) Owning property in another legal entity such as an LLC does
not in itself negate the existence of a sole proprietorship.
§ 3. Creation of a Sole Proprietorship
(1) A sole proprietorship results from the operation of an unincorporated or non-LLC business for profit that is owned by one person, whether or not the operator intends to create a sole proprietorship. Its existence does not require compliance with an enabling
statute. Its operation should also comply with other statutes such as
licensing, permits, safety, taxation, and zoning, but its existence as a
sole proprietorship does not require such compliance.
(2) By operation of law, a failed attempt either to create a oneperson limited liability company or to create a one-person corporation results in the creation of a sole proprietorship.
(3) By operation of law, the sole surviving partner of a duly created partnership who rightfully or wrongfully continues the business
of the former partnership operates the business as a sole proprietor,
unless a new partnership is formed through the election of an additional partner(s).
§ 4. Sole Proprietorship Property
(1) Sole proprietorship property shall include but not be limited
to all property originally brought into the sole proprietorship, stock,
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or property subsequently acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the sole proprietorship.
(2) Unless the contrary intention is manifested at the time of acquisition, property acquired with sole proprietorship funds is sole
proprietorship property.
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the sole proprietorship name or in an assumed or fictitious name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the sole proprietorship name.
(4) A conveyance to a sole proprietorship in the sole proprietorship name, though without words of inheritance, passes the entire
sole proprietorship interest of the grantor unless a contrary intent
appears.
§ 5. The Sole Proprietor is an Agent of the Sole Proprietorship as to the Sole
Proprietorship Business
(1) The sole proprietor is an agent of the sole proprietorship for
the purposes of its business, and the act of the sole proprietor, including the execution in the sole proprietorship name of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
sole proprietorship binds the sole proprietorship, unless the sole
proprietor so acting has in fact no authority to act for the sole proprietorship in the particular matter, and the person with whom she is
dealing has knowledge of the fact that she has no such authority.
When executing a contract on behalf of the sole proprietorship, a
sole proprietor identifies when she is acting in representative capacity
by using the designation “owner” or “proprietor” following her signature. Failure to do so results in direct personal liability.
(2) An act of the sole proprietor which is not apparently for the
carrying on of the business of the sole proprietorship in the usual way
does not bind the sole proprietorship.
(3) Unless clearly contrary to the terms of the sole proprietorship,
the sole proprietor shall have the authority to:
(a) Assign the sole proprietorship property in trust for creditors or on the assignee’s promise to pay the debts of the sole proprietorship,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it possible to carry on
the ordinary business of the sole proprietorship,
(d) Confess a judgment, or
(e) Submit a sole proprietorship claim or liability to arbitration
or reference.
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(4) No act of a sole proprietor in contravention of a restriction on
authority shall bind the sole proprietorship to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
§ 6. Conveyance of Real Property of the Sole Proprietorship
(1) Where title to real property is in the sole proprietorship name,
the sole proprietor may convey title to such property by a conveyance
executed in the sole proprietorship name and shall pass both the legal interest of the sole proprietorship and the equitable interest of
the sole proprietor.
(2) Where title to sole proprietorship real property is in the name
of the sole proprietor, and the record does not disclose the right of
the sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor may convey title to such
property.
(3) These provisions are not intended to change any existing operation of state or federal law relative to rule of property law, spousal
rights, or marital interests.
§ 7. Sole Proprietorship Bound by Sole Proprietor’s Wrongful Acts
Where, by any wrongful act or omission of the sole proprietor acting in the ordinary course of the business of the sole proprietorship,
loss or injury is caused to any person, or any penalty is incurred, the
sole proprietorship is liable therefore to the same extent as the sole
proprietor so acting or omitting to act.
§ 8. Sole Proprietorship Bound by Sole Proprietor’s Breach of Trust
The sole proprietorship is bound to make good the loss:
(a) Where the sole proprietor acting within the scope of her actual or apparent authority receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(b) Where the sole proprietorship in the course of its business receives money or property of a third person and the money or property so received is misapplied by the sole proprietor or any agent of
the sole proprietor while it is in the custody of the sole proprietorship.
§ 9. Nature of Sole Proprietor’s Liability
The sole proprietor is liable:
(a) Personally for everything chargeable to the sole proprietorship
under sections 13 and 14.
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(b) Personally for all other debts and obligations of the sole proprietorship.
§ 10. Rules Determining the Rights and Duties Between the Sole Proprietor
and the Sole Proprietorship
The duties and rights of the sole proprietor in relation to the sole
proprietorship shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
(a) The sole proprietor shall be repaid her contributions, whether
by way of capital or advances to the sole proprietorship property, and
share totally in the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities,
including those to creditors, are satisfied; and must contribute totally
towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the
sole proprietorship.
(b) The sole proprietorship must indemnify the sole proprietor in
respect of payments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by her in the ordinary and property conduct of its business, or
for the preservation of its business or property.
§ 11. Sole Proprietorship Books.
The sole proprietorship books shall be kept, subject to any
agreement between the sole proprietor and the sole proprietorship,
at the principal place of business of the sole proprietorship, and the
sole proprietor shall at all times have access to and may inspect and
copy them.
§ 12. Sole Proprietor as a Fiduciary
The sole proprietor must account to the sole proprietorship for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by her from
any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the sole proprietorship or from any use by her of its property.
§ 13. Right to an Account
A sole proprietor shall have the right to a formal account as to
sole proprietorship affairs.
§ 14. Continuation of Sole Proprietorship Beyond Fixed Term
(1) When a sole proprietorship for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued after the termination of such term or particu-
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lar undertaking without any express agreement, the rights and duties
of the sole proprietor remains the same as they were at such termination, so far as is consistent with a sole proprietorship at will.
(2) A continuation of the business by the sole proprietor as habitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liquidation of the sole proprietorship’s affairs, is prima facie evidence of
a continuation of the sole proprietorship.
§ 15. Extent of Property Rights of a Sole Proprietor
The property rights of sole proprietor are (1) her rights in specific
sole proprietorship property, (2) her interest in the sole proprietorship, and (3) her right to total control in the management of the sole
proprietorship, subject to creditors’ rights.
§ 16. Nature of a Sole Proprietor’s Right in Specific Sole Proprietorship
Property
(a) A sole proprietor is the sole owner of specific sole proprietorship property holding as an “owner in sole proprietorship.”
(b) A sole proprietor’s right to specific sole proprietorship property is assignable.
(c) A sole proprietor interest in specific sole proprietorship property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim
against the sole proprietorship.
(d) When sole proprietorship property is attached for a sole proprietorship debt, the sole proprietor cannot claim any right under
the homestead or exemption laws.
(e) On the death of the sole proprietor, her right in specific sole
proprietorship property vests in her legal representative.
§ 17. Nature of a Partner’s Interest in the Sole Proprietorship
A sole proprietor’s interest in the sole proprietorship is her total
share of the profits and surplus, and the same is personal property.
§ 18. Assignment of a Sole Proprietor’s Interest; Conveyance of the Business
(1) A conveyance by a sole proprietor of her interest in the sole
proprietorship does not of itself dissolve the sole proprietorship, nor,
entitle the assignee, during the continuation of the sole proprietorship, to interfere in the management or administration of the sole
proprietorship business or affairs, or require any information or account of sole proprietorship transactions, or to inspect the sole pro-
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prietorship books; but it merely entitles the assignee to receive in accordance with her contract the profits to which the sole proprietor
would otherwise be entitled.
(2) In order for a sole proprietor to sell or convey the sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor must sell or convey the entire sole
proprietorship including its assets (property), interests, and all rights
thereto.
§ 19. Sole Proprietor’s Interest Subject to a Charging Order
On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of the sole proprietor, the court which entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other court, may charge the interest of the
debtor sole proprietor with payment of the unsatisfied amount of
such judgment debt with interest thereon; and may then or later appoint a receiver of her share of the profits, and or any other money
due or to fall due to her in respect of the sole proprietorship, and
make all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries which the
debtor sole proprietor might have made, or which the circumstances
of the case may require.
§ 20. Dissolution Following the Death of the Sole Proprietor
(1) Upon the death of the sole proprietor, the sole proprietorship
shall terminate. The property of the sole proprietorship shall automatically become the property of the sole proprietor’s estate, subject
to creditors’ rights.
(2) If the sole proprietorship is created for a purpose, or term, the
death of the sole proprietor will not terminate the sole proprietorship so long as the continuation of the sole proprietorship has been
anticipated and agreed to by the sole proprietor. The sole proprietor
may make provisions for the management of the sole proprietorship
upon her death.
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APPENDIX C: DISTRIBUTION OF SOLE PROPRIETORS AND THEIR GROSS
251
RECEIPTS BY SIZE OF PROPRIETORSHIP, TAX YEAR 2003

251

Chart from U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING
THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE

5 (2007).

